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FILLINGFEDERALAPPELLATE VACANCIES 
Carl Tobias t 
Judicial selection for the United States Courts of Appeals has rarely been 
so controversial. Delay in nominating and analyzing candidates as well as 
fractious accusations, recriminations, and "paybacks" between Democrats 
and Republicans have vexed circuit appointments over two decades. Many 
judgeships remain empty for long periods, while one position has been 
vacant since 1994. Certain appellate tribunals have confronted acute 
difficulties. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently 
operated absent half its judicial complement across eight months, and 
numerous courts labored without one in three members at various junctures. 
The Senate, which furnishes advice and consent, has accorded particular 
nominees only minimal consideration. To illustrate, the Senate avoided a 
confirmation vote on U.S. District Judge Terrence Boyle for almost seven 
years and delayed the elevation of Ninth Circuit Judge Richard Paez, which 
demanded the longest time in American history. 1 Moreover, the Judiciary 
Committee, which assumes major responsibility for upper chamber 
evaluation, increasingly votes along party lines. The committee did not 
scrutinize Michigan Court of Appeals Judge Helene White throughout 
President Bill Clinton's final administration, although she received 
confirmation near the end of the George W. Bush presidency.2 The 107th 
and 110th Senates afforded multiple Bush candidates nominal attention for 
twenty months, and Democrats periodically invoked or threatened 
filibusters when blocking controversial Republican nominees. 
The phenomenon of myriad lengthy openings has adverse effects on 
selection, courts and judges, those who participate in appointments, and 
counsel and litigants. For instance, extensive vacancies have slowed 
t Williams Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. I wish to thank Thomas 
E. Baker, Theresa Beiner, A. Christopher Bryant, Jay Bybee, Michael Gerhardt, Sheldon 
Goldman, Arthur Hellman, Margaret Sanner and Elliot Slotnick for valuable suggestions, Paul 
Birch, Suzanne Corriell, Tricia Dunlap, Scott Jones and Gail Zwimer for valuable research, 
Tracy Cauthom for valuable processing, and Russell Williams for generous, continuing support. 
Errors that remain are mine. 
1. Mickey Kaus, No Justice, No Paez, SLATE, March 12, 2000, Kausfiles Special, 
available at http://www.slate.com/id/1004818/; Charles Lane, N.C. Judge Has Spent 15 Years 
as a Nominee: Judge Derailed by Partisan Issues, WASH. POST, May 12, 2005, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/11/ AR2005051102029.html. 
2. Michael Abramowitz, Ye Shall Be Judged-Not, WASH. POST, May 5, 2008, at A15, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/ content/ article/2008/05/04/ AR200805040193 6 .html ?hpid=sec-po litics. 
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appellate disposition and undercut inexpensive and fair resolution, while 
empty judgeships led courts of appeals to cancel oral arguments. The 
dilemma's persistence has concomitantly undermined regard for all three 
branches of government. Despite the complications assessed, President 
Barack Obama and the new upper chamber have a valuable opportunity to 
rectify or ameliorate the concerns. 
These ideas demonstrate that appellate court selection requires 
examination, which this article undertakes. The first part investigates why 
so many circuit nominees languish over prolonged times and detects a few 
explanations. Among the most important explanations is the significance of 
the appellate tribunals. Courts of appeals are basically courts of last resort 
for geographic areas, especially when they decide controversial issues 
respecting questions such as the death penalty, religion, and abortion, 
because the Supreme Court now hears a minuscule number of appeals. 
Equally responsible is divided government, a regime in which one party 
controls the Executive Branch and the other controls the Senate. Democratic 
and Republican presidents, as well as upper chambers, assumed opposing 
views and deserve similar responsibility for the conundrum. The parties 
depended on relatively identical approaches once both captured the White 
House and the Senate, although they might have cured the difficulty by 
applying the necessary political will. 
Section two canvasses the appointment of circuit judges across the Bush 
years. This evaluation finds that multifarious and longstanding 
considerations-which include tardy nomination and analysis of candidates 
as well as Republican and Democratic allegations and retorts-hampered 
the selection process and may have exacerbated the problem. Illuminating 
examples include the 2002 Judiciary Committee determinations with nine 
Republicans voting for and ten Democrats voting against Judges Priscilla 
Owen and Charles Pickering, even though the whole Senate actually might 
have confirmed both. 3 Analogous were the jurists' 2003 re-nomination and 
the decision championing the recess appointments of Pickering and William 
Pryor the next year. President Bush similarly nominated Department of 
Defense General Counsel William Haynes and Judge Boyle multiple times, 
although a few Grand Old Party (GOP) senators had rejected the 
candidates. 4 As trenchant was Democrats' invocation of filibusters to 
oppose certain nominees. 
3. Helen Dewar, Senate Panel Rejects Bush Nominee, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2002, 
available at 
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20020906&slug=judge06. 
4. See Jerry Markon, Vacancies Whittle Away Right's Hold on Key Court, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 8, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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The last segment, accordingly, proffers recommendations which may 
solve or temper the dilemma. The Chief Executive ought to name attorneys 
whom upper chamber members approve because they are consensus 
nominees. The Senate, for its part, might review and adopt numerous 
concepts which improve appointments. Thus, when senators deem 
candidates unpalatable, the legislators may want to advocate putative 
nominees whom they believe superior. A related, efficacious device is 
consultation, whereby the administration requests, and chamber members 
provide, frank, informative advice on candidates whom the White House is 
examining before their actual nomination. 
I. THE RISE AND GROWTH OF THE DILEMMA 
A. Introduction 
The history of the complications that have accompanied circuit selection 
appears to merit nominal discussion in this piece, because others have 
treated the background5 and the current situation is most applicable. 
Nonetheless, considerable inquiry is warranted because this might enhance 
understanding of the appellate tribunals, the concerns which presidents and 
senators have voiced regarding appointments, and today's conditions 
assessed in the next part. 
The conundrum implicating appeals court selection actually has two 
major constituents. The first component is the persistent openings difficulty 
that is ascribed to enlarged federal jurisdiction and caseload rises since the 
1960s. These attributes made the bench grow, which increased the number 
and occurrence of vacancies, and complicated attempts to fill them. The 
second constituent is the contemporary dilemma, which is effectively 
political and mainly results from disparate White House and Senate control 
dyn/content/article/2007 /08/07IAR2007080701896.html?hpid=topnews; Adam White & Kevin 
White, Misjudging McCain: He Was Right About the Nuclear Option, WEEKLY STANDARD, Jan. 
18, 2008, available at 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer _preview.asp?idArticle= 14603&R = 13BB8 l D; 
Lane, supra note 1. 
5. See, e.g., WHITE BURKETT MILLER CENTER OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION ON THE SELECTION OF FEDERAL JUDGES 3-6 (1996), 
http://webl.millercenter.org/commissions/comm _ 1996.pdf [hereinafter MILLER REPORT]; 
Gordon Bermant et al., Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible 
Solutions, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 319, 320-23 (1994). I depend substantially in this sentence and 
throughout this paper on these sources and on Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time 
of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527, 529-31 (1998). 
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by Republicans and Democrats respectively over the last 20 years. The 
article focuses on this notion, and its political dimensions, as they best 
inform the signature concerns about circuit appointments. However, a 
somewhat cursory review of the longstanding problem is justified because 
this may accentuate an appreciation for the contemporary situation. 6 
B. The Dilemma of Persistent Vacancies 
The perennial difficulty of filling vacancies comprises numerous strands, 
mostly regarding Article II of the Constitution and the American founding. 
Nevertheless, I concentrate on its modem hallmarks, whose primary sources 
have been expanding jurisdiction and burgeoning appeals that led Congress 
to authorize greater numbers of judgeships, which multiplied the quantity 
and frequency of openings as well as the selection complications. 
1. The Origins and Early History 
The appointments clause directs the President to nominate, and with 
Senate advice and consent, appoint judges. 7 Many constitutional Framers, 
notably Alexander Hamilton, believed the chamber would operate as a 
measured safeguard against chief executives' propensity for favoritism, 
would limit the approval of unqualified lawyers, and would bring needed 
stability. 8 The Founders realized that politics would be meaningful, and 
occasionally crucial, to appointments. 
6. It merits less, as some delay is intrinsic and thus resists easy solution, while politics 
explains it more than the current dilemma, which others have analyzed. See Bermant et al., 
supra note 5, at 319-20; COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL COURTS, Remedying the Permanent Vacancy 
Problem in the Federal Judiciary- The Problem of Judicial Vacancies and Its Causes, 42 REc. 
Ass'N B. CITY N.Y. 374 (1987) [hereinafter N.Y. CITY BAR]; Sarah A. Binder & Forrest 
Maltzman, Senatorial Delay in Confirming Federal Judges, 1947-1998, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 190, 
190-91 (2002); Victor Williams, Solutions to Federal Judicial Gridlock, 76 JUDICATURE 185, 
186 (1993). 
7. Appellate selection may be vested in the judiciary. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Tuan 
Samahon, The Judicial Vesting Option: Opting Out of Nomination and Advice and Consent, 67 
Omo ST. L.J. 783, 784 (2006); see Elliot E. Slotnick, Appellate Judicial Selection During the 
Bush Administration, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 225, 226-27 (2006). The Constitution delegates the 
President and the Senate more responsibility than the House and the bench. The President 
includes Executive officers, such as White House Counsel and Justice Department lawyers. The 
Senate includes the Judiciary Committee, the Majority Leader, and individual senators. 
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 510, 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961); see MICHAEL GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 28 (2000); SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER 
COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 5 (1997); JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, 
SUPREME CONFLICT 47-52, 308 (2007); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD 
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Senators have been involved with the process since the country's origins, 
as they essentially have a pivotal stake in approving judges, while complex 
political accommodations that implicate the lawmakers and presidents 
during nascent stages of the regime, have effectively fostered its operation. 9 
The body's members traditionally helped identify and confirm nominees, 
particularly for district vacancies. Senators, or high-level elected officials of 
the administration's party who were from the state where the position 
opened, commonly recommended aspirants whom the White House in tum 
nominated. 10 
Politics, accordingly, has long suffused, and is a critical facet of, 
appointments. If the President and senators differ, the legislators can affect 
judicial choices in part by tactically relying on delay. 11 For example, 
Senator Spencer Abraham (R-Mich.) obstructed chamber review of 
Michigan attorneys whom President Clinton had nominated in his final 
administration, and the jurisdiction's Democratic Senators Carl Levin and 
Debbie Stabenow prevented hearings on four Michigan nominees over 
Bush's initial two years. 12 Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) analogously 
restricted chamber analysis of many prospects whom President Clinton 
designated for Fourth Circuit vacancies in North Carolina, while Senator 
OF THE SUPREME COURT 265-66 (2007). See generally CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT 
JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (2007); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Ideology and the Selection of Federal Judges, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619 (2003). 
9. HAROLD w. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS 7 (1972); Bermant et 
al., supra note 5, at 321; see GERHARDT, supra note 8, at 29-34; Albert P. Melone, The Senate's 
Confirmation Role in Supreme Court Nominations and the Politics of Ideology Versus 
Impartiality, 75 JUDICATURE 68, 70 (1991). 
10. President Dwight D. Eisenhower chose few nominees whom home-state senators 
would oppose. See Lawrence E. Walsh, The Federal Judiciary ... Progress and the Road 
Ahead, 43 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 155, 156 (1960); see also MILLER REPORT, supra note 5, at 
4 (stating Attorney General Robert Kennedy's view of judicial confirmation process as 
"Senatorial appointment with the advice and consent of the President."). 
11. CHASE, supra note 9, at 14, 40; Bermant et al., supra note 5, at 321; see Melone, supra 
note 9, at 73-79. 
12. Jonathan Ringel, The Battle for the 6th Circuit, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at 8; 
Nedra Pickler, Bush Picks State Judge for Appeals Panel: Richard Griffin's Nomination to the 
6th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals May Be Blocked by Senators Debbie Stabenow and Carl 
Levin, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, June 27, 2002, at A15; see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, v ACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Dec. 1, 2002), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/archives/02-1201/list.pdf; Sheldon Goldman et al., Picking 
Judges in a Time of Turmoil: W. Bush's Judiciary During the I09th Congress, 90 JUDICATURE 
252, 270 (2007); Paul Egan & Gordon Trowbridge, Bush, Mich. Senators End Fed Judge Fight, 
DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 16, 2008, at lA, available at 
http://infoweb.newsbank.com.ezproxy l .lib.asu.edu/iw-
search/we/Info W eb?p _product= A WNB&p _ theme=aggregated5&p _action=doc&p _ docid= 1234 
E6A8795D2E40&p_docnum=l&p_queryname=l; infra notes 49, 91, 93, 131, 140, 145, 147, 
164-66, 168, 188-91 and accompanying text. 
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John Edwards (D-N.C.) precluded assessment of Judge Boyle, whom 
Senator Helms favored, in the 107th Congress. 13 So long as advice and 
consent is mandatory for appointment, the White House and the institution 
will face tensions. 14 
The Chief Executive and the Senate, therefore, have chosen judges in a 
regime that was always politicized. However, the need to fill large numbers 
of vacancies that were empty for protracted times has only become severe in 
the past thirty years. For virtually two centuries after Congress enacted the 
1789 Judiciary Act, court of appeals and district judgeships gradually 
reached 300; the few, and comparatively infrequent, vacancies permitted 
lawyers' smooth appointment and minimized the complications which 
ultimately arose. 15 
2. History Since 1960 
Federal jurisdiction has greatly expanded since the 1960s. 16 Lawmakers 
federalized much criminal activity and instituted a plethora of civil actions, 
so trial court suits experienced 300 percent annual growth over the last five 
decades. 17 Congress responded to these docket rises by substantially 
13. See Roland S. Martin, Commentary: Don't Sanitize Helms' Racist Past, CNN.COM, 
July 2, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/07/09/roland.martin/index.html; David G. 
Savage, Clinton Losing Fight for Black Judge, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 2000, at Al, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2000/jul/07/news/mn-49040; see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Dec. 1, 2002), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/archives/02-1201/list.pdf; Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial 
Selection in the Fourth Circuit, 80 N.C. L. REV. 2001, 2025-29 (2002). See generally infra 
notes 49, 90, 93, 166, 169, 171, 186-87 and accompanying text. 
14. There seem to be two major ways of addressing the constitutional restraint. "One 
requires constitutional interpretation, the other constitutional amendment." Bermant et al., supra 
note 5, at 322. 
15. MILLER REPORT, supra note 5, at 3; Slotnick, supra note 7, at 229; Tobias, supra note 
5,at531. 
16. See MILLER REPORT, supra note 5, at 3. See generally Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari 
and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1264, 1268-70 (1996); Martha 
J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 WIS. L. 
REV. 11, 23-24. 
17. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-14223 (2006)); Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006)); see also William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical 
Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719, 722-23 (1995); Slotnick, supra note 7, at 238. 
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augmenting the number of active judges, and creating 179 appellate and 678 
district seats. 18 
When the Judicial Conference of the U.S. Committee on Long Range 
Planning analyzed the court system fourteen years ago, it predicted that 
docket increases would necessitate tripling judgeships by 2010 and would 
require even more additions one decade later. 19 Moreover, the number of 
judgeships will continue to grow because lawmakers will not reduce 
jurisdiction,20 although those officers, jurists, practitioners, and scholars 
think the bench's magnitude is controversial, especially at the appellate 
level. 21 The committee also found that the period needed to appoint judges 
had lengthened considerably, and much delay happened between the time a 
position opened and the time the Chief Executive recruited someone. 22 In 
the decade and a half following 1980, the average confirmation required 
three months and the average nomination required twelve, while the actual 
time mandated for both dramatically increased. 23 A helpful Federal Judicial 
Center (FJC) study ascertained that vacancy rates from 1970 until 1992 
were practically twice as high in the district courts, and this vacancy rate 
was even greater for the appellate tribunals. 24 
The persistent conundrum appears to impose a broad range of 
detriments. For example, the conundrum has seemingly prolonged actions' 
resolution in the district courts and restricted expeditious, inexpensive, and 
fair appellate disposition. It has also exerted unnecessary pressures on 
judges as well as frustrated clients and attorneys who must compete for 
18. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 133 (2006). See generally ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Aug. 1, 2009), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/archives/200908/j <larvae 1 _current_ circuit.html. 
19. See U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN 
FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 16 (1995), http://www.uscourts.gov/lrp/CH02.PDF [hereinafter 
LONG RANGE PLAN] (The committee predicted that 1,370 judgeships would be required by 
2000. Nevertheless, Congress failed to authorize the seats mainly for political reasons.). 
20. MILLER REPORT, supra note 5, at 3; William Reynolds & William Richman, Elitism, 
Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. 
REV. 273 (1996). 
21. Compare Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts: Too Few Judges, Too 
Many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52, with Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, 
A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70; see also sources cited supra note 16; infra notes 68-71, 193-204 
and accompanying text. 
22. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 19, at 103; see also Viveca Novak, Empty-Bench 
Syndrome, TIME, May 26, 1997, at 37. 
23. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 19, at 103-04; see also Novak, supra note 22. 
24. Bermant et al., supra note 5, at 323; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-29 (2006) (creating FJC as 
courts' research arm); William Schwarzer, The Federal Judicial Center and the Administration 
of Justice in the Federal Courts, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1129, 1133 (1995). 
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limited available court resources. 25 Between 1970 and 1992, the openings 
had a statistically significant effect on average workloads for district and 
circuit members often and nine percent respectively. 26 
This assessment suggests politics has influenced federal judicial choices 
since the early days of the American Republic.27 However, many observers 
believe politicization has skyrocketed over the last four decades, 
commencing with the GOP administration of President Richard Nixon, who 
secured his election with a campaign vow to institute "law and order" by 
picking judges characterized as "strict constructionists. "28 A modem variant 
originated with President Ronald Reagan's doomed attempt to grant Robert 
Bork Supreme Court appointment during 1987. 
C. The Contemporary Dilemma 
Political elements apparently have greater relevance to the modem 
selection concern than the longstanding vacancies' dilemma, although 
politics necessarily infuses both and obscures their exact relationship. These 
concepts indicate that political factors undergird the existing difficulty, and 
the two ideas may share responsibility for today's federal appellate court 
appointment process. Accordingly, the present complication warrants much 
examination. 
1. General Survey of the Contemporary Dilemma 
Over the past several decades inexpeditious candidate nomination and 
analysis, as well as Republican and Democratic charges, recriminations, and 
gamesmanship, have frequently accompanied the circuit judge selection 
procedures. Across most of this time frame, the government has been 
divided; one party controlled the White House and the other the Senate. 
25. See N.Y. CITY BAR, supra note 6, at 374; see also Novak, supra note 22; Robert 
Schmidt, The Costs of Judicial Delay, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 28, 1997, at 6 (assessing the 
substantial civil backlogs and their disadvantages); Letter from Lee Cooper, President, A.B.A., 
et al., to President William Clinton & Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, (July 14, 1997), 
reprinted in 143 CONG. REC. S8046 (daily ed. July 24, 1997) [hereinafter Letter from Lee 
Cooper]; William H. Rehnquist, 1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THE THIRD 
BRANCH, Jan. 1998, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jan98ttb/january.htm. 
26. Bermant et al., supra note 5, at 327; see also Schwarzer, supra note 24. 
27. Supra text accompanying notes 7-15; see GERHARDT, supra note 8, at 257; GOLDMAN, 
supra note 8, at 2. 
28. See, e.g., DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE 20 (1988); GOLDMAN, supra note 8, 
at 205-06; Roger F. Hartley & Lisa M. Holmes, Increasing Senate Scrutiny of Lower Federal 
Court Nominees, 80 JUDICATURE 274, 274 (1997); Slotnick, supra note 7, at 228-29; see also 
inji-a text accompanying notes 162-63. 
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There are numerous explanations why more controversy has beset the 
appellate nomination process as opposed to the federal district or Supreme 
Court nomination processes. First, a small number of High Court vacancies 
occurred in the last two decades and most people engendered little 
opposition. After the controversial appointment of Justice Clarence 
Thomas, presidents have generally nominated, and the Senate has approved, 
individuals with relatively moderate views. 29 Choosing district judges has 
also been the prerogative of elected figures who represent the locales where 
openings arise. Senatorial courtesy and the notion that district judgeships 
constitute practically the sole remnant of unalloyed patronage mean that the 
vacancies are infrequently disputed. Third, the regional circuits are 
effectively deemed the courts of last resort in their areas to decide 
fundamental issues, such as questions regarding terrorism and freedom of 
the press, because the Justices entertain so few appeals. 30 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, circuit appointments have functioned 
rather well at various junctures. For instance, President George H. W. Bush 
as well as Democratic and GOP Senate members essentially rejected 
divisive infighting and worked constructively after the battle related to 
Justice Thomas. 31 This promoted the uneventful confirmation of Justice 
David Souter and relatively efficacious appellate and district court selection 
in the early 1990s. However, when the administration terminated, more than 
100 lower court judgeships remained open. 32 Democrats attributed the 
empty positions to the White House which they claimed was slow to 
nominate qualified candidates whom the Democrats found palatable. 33 
29. JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF CLARENCE 
THOMAS 357-59 (1994); TIMOTHY M. PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNITZ, CAPITOL GAMES 425 
(1992); see Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiciary: Many Bridges 
to Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254 (1997). Some observers question whether Chief Justice John 
Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito are relatively moderate. See, e.g., GREENBURG, supra note 8, 
at 191, 301; TOOBIN, supra note 8, at 275-76, 313-14. 
30. Neil A. Lewis, Move to Limit Clinton's Judicial Choices Fails, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 
1997, at DI; Jeffrey Rosen, Obstruction of Judges, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 11, 2002, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/11/magazine/l 1JUDGES.html?pagewanted=1; Editorial, 
Obstruction of Justice, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 19, 1997, at 9; see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 80-81, 194-95 (1996); Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the 
Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 403-04 (1997). 
31. See Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JUDICATURE 
282, 283 (1993). 
32. Denis Rutkus & Mitchell Sollenberger, Judicial Nomination Statistics: U.S. District & 
Circuit Courts, 1977-2003, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Feb. 23, 2004, at CRS-10 tbl.1, available 
at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RL31635 .pdf. 
33. 143 CONG. REC. S2538 (1997); see Goldman, supra note 31; Carl Tobias, More 
Women Named Federal Judges, 43 FLA. L. REV. 477, 477-78 (1991); see The White House, 
Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates Twenty-two to the Federal Bench (Jan. 
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Senate Republicans blamed the vacancies on tardy assessments by the 
Democratic majority, who allegedly delayed nominee assessment in the 
hope that a Democratic candidate would win the presidency. 34 
There were a few unusual times when selection operated rather 
effectively in President Bill Clinton's Administration. For example, 
cooperative actions of the President and Democratic senators, who 
controlled the body, and their outreach to the GOP, yielded 125 judicial 
appointments the first half term. 35 Moreover, the upper chamber approved 
sixty jurists four years later, when Republicans dominated the institution.36 
Between early 1995 when the GOP possessed a majority in the Senate, 
thereby reestablishing a divided government, and the end of the final 
Clinton Administration, assertions and countercharges as well as rampant 
distrust often attended the judicial selection process. Thus, when President 
Clinton finished his second administration, thirty circuit judgeships lacked 
occupants, which resembled the number of appellate judicial vacancies that 
existed when his presidency began. 37 
Following the 2000 elections, the GOP enjoyed a thin chamber majority, 
and the government was no longer divided. This regime only prevailed until 
7, 1997) [hereinafter The White House January]; The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, 
President Clinton Nominates Thirteen to the Federal Bench (July 31, 1997) [hereinafter The 
White House July]; Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts in an Election Year, 49 SMU L. 
REV. 309 (1996); Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 29; Orrin G. Hatch, There's No Vacancy 
Crisis in the Federal Courts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1997, at Al5 (affording data); infra note 60 
and accompanying text. 
34. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 31, at 282-85; see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Jan. 20, 1993), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/archives/198l_1985/Jan _ Vacancies_l 993.pdf; 143 CONG. 
REC. S2538, S2538-41 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997). See generally Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal 
Judicial Selection, 1993 BYUL. REV. 1257, 1270-74. 
35. Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Selection Under Clinton: A Midterm Examination, 78 
JUDICATURE 276, 278-79 (1995); Carl Tobias, Increasing Balance on the Federal Bench, 32 
Hous. L. REv. 137, 145-46 (1995). 
36. See Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's Second Term Judiciary: Picking 
Judges Under Fire, 82 JUDICATURE 265, 267 (1999); Carl Tobias, Choosing Judges at the Close 
of the Clinton Administration, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 827, 841-44 (2000); Carl Tobias, Leaving a 
Legacy on the Federal Courts, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 315, 325-27 (1999); see also Novak, supra 
note 22; Letter from Lee Cooper, supra note 25; Rehnquist, supra note 25. 
37. U.S. COURTS, supra note 34; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, v ACANCIES IN THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Jan. 4, 2001), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/O 1042001/judgevacancy.htm; see Carl Tobias, Dear 
President Bush, 67 Mo. L. REV. 1, 1 (2002). The Clinton impeachment, like the Bush U.S. 
Attorney controversy, complicated judicial selection. See RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF 
STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 124-32 (1999); 
DAVID IGLESIAS, IN JUSTICE: INSIDE THE SCANDAL THAT ROCKED THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
(2008); Dan Eggen, Several Top Positions at Justice Department Unfilled, WASH. POST, Dec. 
23, 2007, at A9; infra text accompanying note 134. 
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May 2001, when Democrats resumed control of the institution; yet, 
Democratic control of the Senate was short-lived, as Republicans captured a 
narrow majority in 2002, which the GOP sustained and essentially increased 
over the next four years. 38 
2. Analysis of the Contemporary Dilemma 
I attempt to describe below the contemporary conundrum through the 
actions of, and the viewpoints enunciated by, individuals and entities 
involved with the federal court appointment process. The subsection 
evaluates the last Clinton, and the initial George W. Bush, Administrations, 
emphasizing the first year of both. The federal court appointments process 
then, and over the specific presidencies, is comparatively recent and 
analogous in certain ways, and especially telling is the significance of 
divided government. 
Many political considerations, which implicated selection over the two 
administrations, underlay the existing circumstances, but a few aspects of 
the longstanding complication have involved appointments since 1997, 
particularly in 1997 and 2001. The Republican and Democratic chief 
executives and senators - including the Majority Leaders, the Judiciary 
panels, and numerous specific members - were responsible for the 
perpetuation of the current dilemma. These officials alone or together could 
have stopped or limited a number of problems, had they mustered sufficient 
political will. 
The period of time that the Clinton and Bush Administrations, as well as 
the Senate, required to complete the nomination and approval processes was 
lengthy and similar throughout most of 1997 and 2001. For instance, over 
the first period of President Clinton's second administration and the initial 
period of President Bush's first administration, more than 600 days on 
average were consumed by nominations, and confirmations took a record 
high of six months. 39 
38. See Slotnick, supra note 7, at 235. Senator James Jeffords (R-Vt.) became an 
independent during May 2001. See Neil A. Lewis, Road to Federal Bench Gets Bumpier in 
Senate, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2001, at A16; David Rogers, Sen. Jeffords Defects From GOP, 
Creating Era of 'Tripartisanship', WALL ST. J., May 25, 2001, at A16; Review and Outlook, 
True Bipartisanship, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2001, at Al6; see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (April 1, 2003), 
http://www. uscourts. gov /vacancies/ archives/03-0401 /list. pdf. 
39. Novak, supra note 22; see Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Confirmation Wars: Ideology 
and the Battle for the Federal Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 871, 904-08 (2004) (affording 
comparable data on Clinton's second, and Bush's first, term); Editorial, Clearing the Bench: 
Federal Court Vacancies are Delaying Justice, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 17, 1997, at Al6 
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a. Nomination Process 
The dearth of 1997 and 2001 appointments may have resulted in part 
from slow nomination. Certain difficulties should be ascribed to the chief 
executives and the bodies' members or other figures who suggested 
attorneys for White House consideration. In 1997, however, additional 
participants, especially Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) and 
Judiciary Chair Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), and Republican lawmakers, stalled 
analysis as they harbored concerns about issues, namely the proclivity of 
candidates for "judicial activism." In 2001, the Republican leaders' 
counterparts, Senators Thomas Daschle (D-S.D.) and Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), 
might have stymied assessment because they worried about the political 
views of GOP nominees. 
The chief executives appeared somewhat responsible for the lack of 
confirmations attributed to the delay when proposing individuals. For 
example, in January, President Clinton sent 22 attorneys, many of whom 
had been transmitted the year before or already received hearings or 
Judiciary Committee approval, but a few of whom GOP senators opposed, 
while President Bush did not tender his first circuit nominee list until May 
and it omitted prominent attorneys considered earlier.40 Both gradually, if 
sporadically, afforded more counsel. Instructive was their propensity to 
advance big groups as the chamber neared recess. 41 Most attorneys tapped 
seemed highly qualified, and numerous particular designees had been 
federal or state court judges.42 Quite a few nominees apparently held rather 
moderate views. Several were not members of the party that controlled the 
(also affording comparable data on Clinton's second, and Bush's first, term); LONG RANGE 
PLAN, supra note 15 (affording comparable 1980-1995 data); Hatch, supra note 33; see also 
infra note 141 (affording comparable data on Bush's terms). 
40. See The White House January, supra note 33; President's Remarks Announcing 
Nominations for the Federal Judiciary, 1 PUB. PAPERS 504 (May 9, 2001) [hereinafter 
President's Remarks]. Those omitted were Rep. Christopher Cox (R-Cal.), Peter Keisler and 
Judge Carolyn Kuhl, although Bush did nominate Kuhl in September 2001. See Slotnick, supra 
note 7, at 243; infra notes 94, 144 and accompanying text. 
41. See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
(2001), http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/archives_2001.html [hereinafter VACANCIES 2001]; 
Jonathan Ringel, Bush Nominates 18 to Federal Bench, AM. LAW. MEDIA, Aug. 3, 2001, 
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005524433; The White House July, 
supra note 33. President Bush transmitted analogously substantial packages of nominees 
immediately preceding most of the 2001 Senate recesses. 
42. See, e.g., President's Remarks, supra note 40; Tobias, supra note 33; see also 
Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 29. See generally 143 CONG. REC. S5653 (daily ed. June 16, 
1997). 
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White House, and a few were district judges whom earlier administrations 
had appointed. 43 
The chief executives' tendency to proffer many lawyers when Senate 
recesses approached may have complicated the Judiciary panel's attempts to 
facilitate investigations. Although President Clinton had submitted a mere 
eight new attorneys by June 1997, Senator Hatch deemed a couple of the 
attorneys in President Clinton's January package unacceptable, thus 
allowing the committee to make the argument that it lacked the requisite 
candidates for efficient processing. 44 
The administrations failed to select counsel for all circuit and district 
vacancies, which would have pressured the committees and the bodies. 
However, tendering greater numbers than Senators Hatch and Leahy 
suggested they would analyze might have been fruitless. 45 In portions of 
1997 and 2001, the Chief Executives sent more attorneys than the Chairs 
observed they would assess. 46 The presidents also had to balance speed with 
assiduous review of nominee qualifications, as persons who became 
controversial or lacked sufficient ability or character may have eroded 
administration initiatives and delayed or threatened selection. 
The elected officers who recommended individuals to the chief 
executives slowed the appointment process. In jurisdictions without 
senators from the party that controlled the White House, delineating these 
officials and effectively addressing requests that they be involved were very 
time consuming. Across the Clinton Administration, GOP legislators 
essentially insisted on participating and even on suggesting counsel. 47 When 
43. Bush and Clinton elevated district appointees named by the other party. Goldman & 
Slotnick, supra note 29, at 267; Shannon P. Duffy, Clinton Announces Nominees for Eastern 
District Court, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 4, 1997, at l; see David G. Savage, Bush Picks II 
for Federal Bench, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at Al; see also infra notes 74, 159, 162, 165, 
167, 169, 185, 189 and accompanying text. 
44. See Hatch, supra note 39; see also Neil A. Lewis, Keeping Track; Vacant Federal 
Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1997, at A12. Similarly, Bush submitted comparatively few 
new nominees by June 2001 and Senator Leahy's seemingly found certain attorneys in the May 
2001 group unpalatable. See VACANCIES 2001, supra note 41; Neil A. Lewis, Democrats Are 
Pushed on Judicial Nominees, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at A22 [hereinafter Lewis 2001]. 
45. In 1997, Senator Hatch usually held a hearing each month that the 105th Senate was in 
session for one Clinton appellate court nominee and four Clinton district court nominees. See 
infra note 54 and accompanying text. Senator Leahy proceeded rather analogously in 2001. 
Ringel, supra note 41. 
46. See VACANCIES 2001, supra note 41; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, VACANCIES 
IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1997), http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/archives _ l 997.html. 
47. Peter Callaghan, Senators Agree on Selecting Judges, TACOMA NEWS TRIBUNE, Aug. 
12, 1997, at Bl; Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Has a Chance to Shape the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 
1997, at l; see 143 CONG. REc. S2538, S2541 (1997) (suggesting that certain GOP senators 
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President Bush proffered an initial appellate list, nominal consultation was 
afforded to California and Maryland Democratic lawmakers, which 
seemingly undercut the prospects of one attorney in both states.48 Moreover, 
the truncated consideration which Republicans had accorded Clinton 
nominees apparently spurred Democrats' paybacks in Michigan, North 
Carolina, and Ohio. 49 
Each administration had at least certain responsibility for delayed 
submissions. 50 Insofar as they might have asked public officers to expedite 
recommendations of lawyers, White House personnel could have instituted 
additional endeavors, but these may have been frustrated with the "start-up" 
costs of initiating an administration. Helpful examples include the periods 
of time which the presidents consumed assembling the Department of 
Justice (DOJ). 
Presidents Clinton and Bush, accordingly, treated nomination matters 
similarly in 1997 and much of 2001. They failed to rely on the same 
concepts, yet the differences were not issues of kind. The administrations 
may correspondingly have anticipated or resolved some problems by 
deriving lessons from earlier judicial selection work, but a few 
complications appeared to be intrinsic. 
b. American Bar Association Evaluation 
Throughout the 105th Congress, the American Bar Association (ABA) 
Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, which has analyzed and ranked 
nominees in terms of intelligence, ethics, diligence, collegiality, 
independence, and temperament for at least 50 years, continued to provide a 
apparently insisted on participating); see also President's Remarks, supra note 40; 143 CONG. 
REc. S2538, (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997). 
48. For California, see Jean 0. Pasco & Henry Weinstein, Cox Gives Up Shot at 
Judgeship, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 2001, at Al; Savage, supra note 43. For Maryland, see David 
L. Greene & Thomas Healy, Bush Sends Judge List to Senate, BALT. SUN, May 10, 2001, at lA; 
Lewis, supra note 38. See generally Slotnick, supra note 7, at 234; President's Remarks, supra 
note 40; Tricia Bishop, U.S. Courts Due for Left Turn with Obama, BALT. SUN, Dec. 7, 2008, at 
lA; Candace Rondeaux, Md. Federal Prosecutor Nominated to Appeals Court in Richmond, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2007, at B3. 
49. For Michigan and North Carolina, see sources cited supra notes 12, 13, 140, 145. For 
Ohio, see Tom Brune, Roadblocks to Justice/ Judgeships Unfilled as Congress Wrangles Over 
Appointees, NEWSDAY, May 9, 2002, at A46; Jack Torry, Court Nominations: Sitting in Limbo, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 30, 2001, at 8A; sources cited infra notes 140, 145, 161. See 
generally Slotnick, supra note 7, at 232, 235. 
50. I depend substantially in this sentence and in the remainder of this paragraph on Helen 
Dewar, Confirmation Process Frustrates President; Clinton Wants Senate GOP to Pick Up 
Pace, WASH. POST, July 25, 1997, at A21; Greg Pierce, Clinton vs. Clinton, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 
12, 1997, at A6. See generally President's Counsel Quits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1996, at B22; 
Savage, supra note 43. 
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service that many people still find valuable. 51 Nevertheless, over time, 
Senator Hatch articulated more concerns respecting Bar Association 
contributions and, in February 1997, he discontinued the American Bar's 
formal participation related to Judiciary Committee assessment, even 
though President Clinton depended on the ratings for his whole second 
administration. 52 During March 2001, the Bush White House concluded that 
it would eschew the group's input prior to submitting attorneys officially.53 
c. Confirmation Process 
In both years, the Judiciary Committee was partly responsible for less 
expeditious appointments because it did not investigate, stage hearings for, 
and vote on more candidates. The panel routinely afforded a hearing in 
which one circuit nominee and five district possibilities appeared each 
month of the 105th Congress's initial session and virtually every month of 
the final Clinton Administration; yet, only nine judges had been confirmed 
through mid-September 1997. 54 President Bush and many additional 
commentators leveled analogous criticisms at the few appellate nomination 
hearings conducted and the few judges approved in 2001; however, the 
51. For this idea as well as the notions that the ABA is too political and requires excessive 
time when it rates nominees, see MILLER REPORT, supra note 5, at 335-36, 338, n.45. See 
generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY- WHAT 
IT Is AND How IT WORKS (1983). 
52. See, e.g., Terry Carter, A Conservative Juggernaut, 83 A.B.A. J., June 1997, at 32; N. 
Lee Cooper, Standing Up to Critical Scrutiny, 83 A.B.A.J., Apr. 1997, at 6; see also Editorial, 
ABA Plots a Judicial Coup, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2008, at A12, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121867190633138889.html; Editorial, The A.B.A. and Judicial 
Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2009, at A22, available at 
http ://www.nytimes.com/2009 /04114/ opinion/ l 4tue2 .html. 
53. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, to Martha Barnett, ABA 
President (Mar. 22, 2001), available at http://abcnews.go.com/us/story?id=93754&page=l; see 
Sheldon Goldman et al., W. Bush's Judiciary: The First Term Record, 88 JUDICATURE 244, 
254-55 (2005); Laura E. Little, The ABA 's Role in Prescreening Federal Judicial Candidates: 
Are We Ready to Give Up on the Lawyers?, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 37, 37, 45 (2001); 
Sidney Blumenthal, Dick Cheney Was Never a "Grown Up", SALON.COM, Apr. 14, 2008, 
http://www.salon.com/books/excerpt/2008/04/14/cheney/. Democrats' insistence on ABA input 
fostered greater delay. See Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings on Judicial Nominations, Oct. 7, 
2002 (statement of Sen. Leahy), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/ getdoc. cgi? dbname= 107 _senate_ hearings&docid=f: 8 8116. wais. pdf [hereinafter Leahy 
Statement]. 
54. See Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the Second Clinton Administration, 24 
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 741 (1997). Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.), the Judiciary Chair from 
1987 until 1994, said that he held one hearing every two weeks. See 143 CONG. REC. S2538, 
S2539 (1997). 
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committee seemed to operate better and had accorded each trial court 
nominee a hearing by spring of the following year. 55 
Limited resources and politics might indicate why 1997 yielded 
appointments for minuscule numbers of designees. Examples were how the 
Judiciary Chair attempted to resolve the controversy involving Bar 
Association participation, and the dispute with Republican senators over the 
Judiciary Chair's confirmation duties and those of the panel and members, 
which eventually led the GOP to retain the status quo. 56 These issues 
devoured resources that could have been used for appointments. The small 
number of 2001 confirmations may also be attributable to deficient 
resources and politics, 57 but Senator Leahy effectuated certain special 
techniques that facilitated investigation, such as unusual hearings during the 
August recess. 58 To the extent Democrats slowed the confirmation process, 
their behavior was apparently payback for Clinton nominees whom the 
lawmakers thought Republicans had stalled. 59 The May decision of GOP 
Senator James Jeffords (Vt.) to become an independent essentially 
prevented the body from thoroughly reorganizing until July, which 
disrupted and slowed the process's initiation and efficacious functioning. 60 
55. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Bush and Democrats in Senate Trade Blame for Judge 
Shortage, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2002, at A9; Editorial, Judicial Nominations Scorecard, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 9, 2002, at A22. 
56. See sources cited supra note 30; see also supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text; 
infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. See generally infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
57. I rely substantially in this sentence and in the remainder of this paragraph on 
Symposium, Symposium on The Judicial Appointments Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
1-176 (2001); Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Senate Judiciary Comm. 
Hearings on Judicial Nominations (Feb. 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy), 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/resources/transcripts/107transcripts.cfm; id. (Mar. 19, 2002) 
(statement of Sen. Hatch); see also Jonathan Ringel, Picking Judges: The Art of the Deal, THE 
RECORDER, Apr. 30, 2001, at 1; Ringel, supra note 41; William Safire, Battle of the Blue Slips, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at A33. 
58. Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings on Potential Judicial Nominations (Aug. 22, Aug. 
27, 2001), http://judiciary.senate.gov/resources/transcripts/107transcripts.cfm; see Lewis 2001, 
supra note 44. 
59. Jess Bravin, Aid Bill is Stalled By Bid to Force Judge Vote, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 
2001, at A16; Paul Gigot, How Feinstein is Repaying Bush on Judges, WALL ST. J., May 9, 
2001, at A26; Neil A. Lewis, Party Leaders Clash in Capitol Over Pace of Filling Judgeships, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at A33. 
60. See supra note 38. The presidents were also responsible. In early 1997 and 2001, they 
sent few nominees, some of whom Hatch, Leahy or others opposed, and sent others unevenly, 
thus delaying selection, but Hatch's claim that he lacked nominees to process seemed 
unpersuasive, as delay also came from the few nominee hearings and votes and senators' 
opposition. By 2001 's end, Bush had also sent enough nominees, but that may have been too 
late for expeditious review. See supra notes 41, 44-45 and accompanying text. 
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Individuals receiving federal bench nomination, who will have life 
tenure and who exercise the substantial power of the state, deserve 
meticulous analysis to insure that they are qualified. Balancing 
comprehensive assessment of candidate ability and ethics with the need for 
alacrity is a rather complex, subtle obligation. Senator Hatch argued that he 
must carefully discharge this assignment, yet not considering more 
nominees was animated by politics to some extent. 61 
Senator Lott and GOP chamber members apparently had greater 
responsibility for creating delay in 1997. Merely nine judges were 
appointed by that September, even though the Judiciary Committee had 
reviewed and approved many people. 62 Certain observers believed that 
analogous Democratic leaders' conduct caused delay in 2001. 63 The 
necessity for addressing other important business and the unanimous 
consent requirement might explicate the delay in placing some nominees 
who had Judiciary panel approval on the Senate calendar and in scheduling 
floor debates and votes. However, the few appointments made throughout 
1997, especially contrasted with prior times, indicate the scheduling of floor 
votes by the GOP's leadership actually deserves much credit. As the 105th 
Congress began, Senator Lott promised to review assiduously each nominee 
whom President Clinton tapped. 64 In spring 1997, Senator Leahy, the 
panel's ranking member, and additional Democratic colleagues, reacted by 
asserting they had supported confirmation endeavors in GOP 
administrations and by urging floor debates, as required, and votes on 
prospects. 65 
61. He treated conflicts in duties to GOP senators who opposed activism but did resist 
opposition to some nominees and the challenge to Senate traditions, while 1997's record 
resembled some in previous, analogous periods. 143 CONG. REC. S2536 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 
1997); supra note 56 and accompanying text; see Ted Gest & Lewis Lord, The GOP's Judicial 
Freeze -A Fight to See Who Rules Over the Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 26, 1997, at 
23; Neil A. Lewis, Republicans Seek Greater Influence in Naming Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 
1997, at§ 1, p. 11; Novak, supra note 22. But see supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
62. This dynamic resembled GOP nominee analysis during the 1996 election year. See 
Hatch, supra note 33; 143 CONG. REc. S8041, S8045 (daily ed. July 24, 1997) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). See generally Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 29, at 257 (recounting the 1996 
treatment); Tobias, supra note 54 (same). 
63. Gigot, supra note 59; Neil A. Lewis, Party Leaders Clash in Capitol over Pace of 
Filling Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2002, at A33. 
64. See Lewis, supra note 47; see also Slotnick, supra note 7, at 233-34; Novak, supra 
note 22. 
65. They said all nominees deserve floor votes. 143 CONG. REc. S2538, S2538-41 (daily 
ed. Mar. 19, 1997). When Lott threatened delay, Leahy reviewed nominees for understaffed 
courts with bipartisan support and unanimous panel votes. 143 CONG. REC. S5653, S5653-54 
(daily ed. June 16, 1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
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d. Nomination and Confirmation 
In 1997 and 2001, Executive Branch and chamber personnel with 
integral selection duties seemingly failed to appreciate the complication's 
seriousness, as manifested in the erratic pace of nominations, Judiciary 
Committee assessment, and candidate approval. Critics argued that the 
present conundrum, and rather significant delay, were motivated by politics 
and questions about the ideological outlook of certain lawyers whom 
administrations transmitted. For example, in 1997, Senators Joseph Biden 
(D-Del.) and Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.) observed that GOP members were 
politicizing confirmation and altering several centuries of tradition. 66 
An apparently political effort, which implicated the existing conundrum 
and stalled processing, was the analysis of how circuit resources are 
distributed and applied. 67 Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), who led the 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, 
attempted to determine whether individual circuits or the appellate system 
needed larger, or even their present, judicial complements. 68 After 
conducting hearings and gathering much applicable information, the 
subcommittee published a report which determined that no tribunals 
required more judges and specific circuits ought not to have additional 
positions until the courts functioned in ways the subcommittee deemed 
more efficient. 69 Appropriate resource use is obviously a valid legislative 
66. Id. at S2538, S2541. Biden even said the GOP was attempting to stop circuit 
appointments. Id. at S2538. Professor Sheldon Goldman analogously said "a newly-elected 
president has [never] faced this sort of challenge to his judicial nominations," while Professor 
Geoffrey Stone characterized the GOP actions as irresponsible. See Gest & Lord, supra note 61 
(quoting both professors). 
67. I depend substantially in this paragraph on CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT AND THE COURTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 106TH 
CONG., CHAIRMAN'S REPORT ON THE APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF JUDGESHIPS IN THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS, Analysis of the Sixth Circuit at 4 (Executive Summary 1999) 
[hereinafter GRASSLEY REPORT] (affording the quotation and idea that some judges opposed 
new seats), and the hearings he held. See, e.g., infra note 68; Tobias, supra note 54; see also 
infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text. 
68. See, e.g., Considering the Appropriate Allocation of Judgeships in the US. Courts of 
Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. ( 1997); 
Considering the Appropriate Allocation of Judgeships in the US. Courts of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts 
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998). See generally supra note 21 and 
accompanying text; infra notes 193-204 and accompanying text. 
69. The Sixth Circuit merits no more judges until it attempts to manage its caseload 
efficiently "by channeling more work to staff counsel and by granting oral argument only ... 
[if] truly necessary." GRASSLEY REPORT, supra note 67; Tobias, supra note 54, at 750 (finding 
that majorities on some courts opposed new seats). 
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concern, but this project delayed appointments for the circuits, which have 
experienced intractable vacancies, numbers of judicial emergencies, and 
substantial rises in appeals. 70 Moreover, lawmakers have failed to pass a 
comprehensive judgeships act since 1990, despite the Judicial Conference 
recommendation for twelve appellate judgeships, a suggestion that the 
federal courts' policymaking arm based on expert conservative projections 
and intensively-assembled empirical data related to case and workloads. 71 
Somewhat analogous considerations accompanied the process over 2001. 
For instance, a mere three of the eleven circuit nominees whom President 
Bush submitted in May were appointed that year. 72 Senator Leahy and a few 
Democrats, including Senator Charles Schumer (N.Y.), announced that the 
body would promptly confirm able, centrist attorneys. 73 Illustrations were 
the easy Senate confirmation of Judges Roger Gregory and Barrington 
Parker, whom President Clinton had first appointed. 74 
Certain activity by officials, whose party was not in control of the White 
House, suggested that politics underlay less expeditious analysis and the 
modem difficulty, namely concerns about the candidates' ostensible 
ideological views. Examples include the appellate court vacancies that 
legislators regard as more significant than district positions because the tiny 
number of appeals that the Supreme Court hears and appellate opinions' 
70. There were 25 vacancies in August of 1997. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
v ACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (August 1, 1997), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/archives_1997.html; see, e.g., On Verge of Recess, Congress 
Acts on Judgeships, THE THIRD BRANCH, Aug. 1997, at 5, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/aug97ttb/august.htm#e. For appeals data, see POSNER, supra note 
30, at 58-64; LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 19, at 10; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
2008 ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR: JUD. Bus. OF THE U.S. COURTS 83. 
71. See Tobias, supra note 54, at 753 (evaluating the recommendations and their 
premises); The Circuit Court of Appeals Restructuring and Modernization Act of 2007, S. 525, 
l lOth Cong. (2007) (providing a judgeships bill); Federal Judgeship Act of2009, S. 1653, 11 lth 
Cong. (2009) (same); 143 CONG. REC. S2538, S2540 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of 
Sen. Biden) (asserting that the Conference demonstrated the need to fill openings and for more 
positions but the GOP urged decreasing judgeships). 
72. See, e.g., Jonathan Groner, Privilege Fight Looms Over Estrada, LEGAL TIMES, June 
3, 2002, at 1; Lewis 2001, supra note 44, at A22; see also supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
But see infra notes 74, 150 and accompanying text. 
73. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, More Battles Loom Over Bush's Nominees for Judgeships, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, at 24; sources cited supra note 55; see also infra notes 98-99 and 
accompanying text. 
74. See Mark Hamblett, Parker Brings Experience and Intellect to Circuit, N.Y.L. J., Oct. 
25, 2001, at l; Neil A. Lewis, Bush Appeals for Peace on His Picks for the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 10, 2001, at A29; see also infra note 159 and accompanying text. Clinton had accorded 
Judge Gregory a recess appointment to the Fourth Circuit. See Allison Mitchell, Senators 
Confirm 3 Judges, Including Once-Stalled Black, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2001, at Al6; see also 
infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
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multistate force demonstrate the tribunals are courts of last resort for these 
jurisdictions. 75 
e. The Possibility of Change 
Insofar as the political phenomena that attended confirmation 
proceedings in 1997 and 2001 and animated the existing conundrum are 
inherent, the phenomena may defy felicitous resolution. The assessment of 
the permanent vacancies dilemma explained that concepts that increase 
resources and efficiency will only influence delay, which is not attributable 
to politics. However, the evaluation of political considerations, which 
recently affected the current difficulty, indicated that elected figures might 
remedy or ameliorate the circumstances if they have enough political will. It 
was only politics that apparently stopped the Clinton and Bush 
Administrations from swiftly choosing additional distinguished individuals 
with centrist viewpoints, and the Senate from rapidly approving them. 
_f Impacts of the Present Conundrum 
The present and longstanding dilemmas underlie numerous concerns, 
quite a few of which are similar. 76 For example, the modem conundrum has 
imposed pressures on appellate and trial judges, lawyers, and parties, effects 
witnessed in factors, such as case and work loads. Accelerating criminal 
actions, a number of which are complex, prevent some judges from trying 
any civil matters, while they require numerous districts to address huge civil 
backlogs and make individuals and entities wait lengthy periods for trials. 77 
Increased filings and empty judgeships in 1997 meant the Ninth Circuit 
postponed 600 oral arguments and caused another tribunal's cancellation of 
60. 78 In July 1997, the purported difficulties attributed to the myriad 
openings and to the attendant ramifications, such as growing criminal 
prosecutions and delayed trials of civil actions, which accompany slowed 
confirmation, led national bar associations to urge that President Clinton 
and Senator Lott move appointments. 79 At the end of 1997 and 2001, Chief 
75. Supra note 30 and accompanying text; see supra notes 29, 33-38 and accompanying 
text. 
76. Supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text; see infra notes 77-80 and accompanying 
text. 
77. See Gest & Lord, supra note 61; see also Schmidt, supra note 25. 
78. Novak, supra note 22; Chronic Federal Judge Shortage Puts Lives, Justice On Hold, 
LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Aug. 13, 1997, at 9A; see id. (documenting Sixth Circuit postponements); 
Bill Kisliuk, Judges' Conference Slams Circuit-Splitting, Vacancies, THE RECORDER, Aug. 19, 
1997, at 1 (same as to Ninth Circuit). 
79. Letter from Lee Cooper, supra note 25. 
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Justice William H. Rehnquist similarly admonished that the White House 
and Senate, controlled by opposite parties, address the confirmation 
impasse. 80 To the extent the public views the judicial appointments process 
as illustrative of egregious, divisive infighting, this conduct may erode 
respect for the government branches. 
In sum, the above investigation of the permanent vacancies dilemma and 
the existing complication reveals that the facets alone and together impaired 
the judicial selection process and, thus, undermined the delivery of justice 
by the regional circuits over the last two decades. The next section, 
accordingly, examines how President Bush tendered prospects and how 
senators confirmed appeals court judges after 2001. 
II. SUBSEQUENT APPEALS COURT APPOINTMENTS 
A few ideas explicate why recent circuit appointments are critical. First, 
this aspect of naming judges is most immediate. The White House and the 
Senate also could not argue efficaciously that inexperience with choosing 
the jurists or each other led to the difficulties which the administration and 
the chamber faced. Moreover, selection across this time resembled the 
process during 1997 and 2001 in multiple respects, namely vis-a-vis 
comparatively slow designee investigation and approval, as well as 
contentions, retorts, and acrimony between Democrats and Republicans. 
These dynamics persisted, and might have worsened, over the Bush years. 
In 2002, certain features of the nomination process may have improved. 
President Bush steadily recommended numerous trial court nominees, many 
of whom were able, ethical, and centrist, while this pace and the lawyers' 
talents, integrity, and viewpoints appeared to foster chamber analysis. 81 By 
way of contrast, the appeals court regime essentially deteriorated. Over 
2002, the President submitted three new lawyers. 82 The whole year, five 
appellate vacancies, which had been open since the administration's 
80. Rehnquist, supra note 25; William H. Rehnquist, 2001 Year-End Report on the 
Federal Judiciary, THE THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 2002, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jan02ttb/jan02.html; see Slotnick, supra note 7, at 233; Linda 
Greenhouse, Rehnquist Sees a Loss of Prospective Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2002, at A16. 
For similar ABA resolutions, see Harvey Saferstein, American Bar Ass 'n Standing Comm. on 
Fed. Judicial Improvements 2008 A.B.A. REP. 118; Editorial, ABA Plots a Judicial Coup, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 14, 2008, at A12; Alfred P. Carlton Jr., More and Faster-Now, 89 A.B.A. J., Apr. 
2003, at 8. 
81. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, v ACANCJES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
(2002), http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/archives _ 2002.html [hereinafter VACANCIES 2002]; 
see also supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text; infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
82. VACANCIES 2002, supra note 81. 
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beginning, lacked nominees. 83 Some of the empty positions included those 
in California, Maryland, and North Carolina. 84 
The ABA continued evaluating the qualifications of, and ranking, 
attorneys designated by the White House. 85 The Standing Committee on 
Judiciary highly rated most nominees and seemed to discharge this 
responsibility in a professional, expeditious manner, which apparently 
dispelled concerns that Bar Association contributions were inefficacious. 86 
Notwithstanding the ABA work, President Bush effectively failed to 
reassess his discontinuance of the Standing Committee's advance 
participation, and this choice actually slowed review when Democrats 
insisted on the entity's involvement before Judiciary Committee votes. 87 
The process of approving candidates was better in several respects, 
analogous in others, and worse in a few. The Judiciary panel granted each 
district nominee a hearing that spring and was current almost the entire 
year, while it held twice as many sessions for circuit nominees by the 
August recess as the committee had offered throughout 2001. 88 Appellate 
consideration improved, largely because eight people testified in February, 
April, May, and June, yet one candidate appeared at hearings during 
numerous other months. 89 Some in the first Bush package never received a 
hearing, and the chamber undertook limited action on two District of 
Columbia and multiple Sixth Circuit nominees across the 107th Congress. 90 
Attorneys proposed for the latter court's Michigan vacancies were not 
83. Id.; see supra notes 40, 45 and accompanying text. But see infra note 101 and 
accompanying text. Bush may have found it fruitless and, thus, a waste of scarce resources to 
send more nominees when so many were pending. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
84. VACANCIES 2002, supra note 81. 
85. I rely mainly in this paragraph on Goldman et al., supra note 53, at 254-55; Groner, 
supra note 72; see also Jonathan Groner, Judge Fight Within ABA, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 12, 
2002, at 1; Ashcroft: Speed up Judge Approvals, NEWSDAY, Aug. 8, 2001, at Al5. See generally 
supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text; infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
86. See supra note 51 and accompanying text; see also supra note 81 and accompanying 
text. 
87. See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also supra note 52 and accompanying 
text. 
88. Supra note 55 and accompanying text; see supra notes 40, 60, 81 and accompanying 
text. 
89. See U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Nominations to U.S. Courts of Appeals 
(2002), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/l 07thCongress-old.cfm [hereinafter 
Nominations - U.S. Courts of Appeals]. See generally supra notes 45, 54-55 and accompanying 
text. 
90. See VACANCIES 2002, supra note 81; see also supra notes 40, 73-74 and 
accompanying text; infra notes 91, 93-94, 106, 131, 140, 164--67, 188-89 and accompanying 
text. 
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afforded hearings any time in the Congress, although President Bush 
forwarded three candidates in 2001 and another the subsequent June. 91 
The Majority Leader was responsible for little delay regarding the 
confirmation process throughout 2002. Senator Daschle rather expeditiously 
scheduled floor votes and debates, when needed, for many trials, and for a 
number of appellate court, possibilities after learning that the Judiciary 
Committee had recommended approval, while the Senate promptly voted on 
them. 92 
Certain attorneys denied hearings were for court of appeals openings, 
and this limited assessment mirrored the treatment which the GOP-
controlled Senate accorded to candidates designated by the Clinton 
Administration. Therefore, the idea of payback may explain inaction on the 
Bush nominees. Helpful examples include two Sixth Circuit Michigan 
vacancies and another in Ohio; a pair of Fourth Circuit unfilled judgeships 
assigned to North Carolina; and two D.C. Circuit openings. The activities in 
Michigan and North Carolina are informative. The GOP had a Michigan 
state judge wait longer than anyone to receive a hearing that never 
materialized, while the chamber avoided votes on several persons President 
Clinton recommended for the empty North Carolina appeals court seats. 93 
Democrats failed to review most individuals proposed for these seven and 
numerous additional vacancies because the nominees engendered much 
controversy, which frequently involved their political views. The Ohio 
attorney, as well as lawyers and judges, recommended to serve on the 
Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits provoked strong, effective opposition from 
appellate court interest and advocacy groups. 94 
Circuit selection was also marked by deleterious allegations and 
countercharges that appeared especially vituperative when controversial 
nominees sought approval. For instance, the Judiciary Committee rejected 
91. See VACANCIES 2001, supra note 41; VACANCIES 2002, supra note 81; see also 
Nominations to U.S. Courts of Appeals, supra note 89; Byron York, Much More Democratic 
Obstruction, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Mar. 20, 2003, available at 
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=OTUyZWNjZjdiNDUwMTA10GMwMDA5MzN1MTEz 
NmElZjQ=. See generally supra note 12; infra notes 93-94, 131, 140, 161-66, 188-89 and 
accompanying text. 
92. See Nominations to U.S. Courts of Appeals, supra note 89; see also supra note 62 and 
accompanying text. See generally infra notes 98, 178 and accompanying text. 
93. For Michigan, see sources cited supra notes 12, 91 and infra notes 94, 131, 140, 164-
66, 188-89. For North Carolina, see Mark Hansen, Logjam, 94 A.B.A. J. 38 (June 2008); 
sources cited supra note 13. Nine people whom President Clinton nominated for the seven 
openings never received Judiciary panel hearings. 
94. The Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuit nominees were Judges Boyle, Kuhl, and John 
Roberts, respectively. Jonathan Groner, Placing Bets on Bush Bench, LEGAL TIMES, May 13, 
2002, at 1; Savage, supra note 43. 
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the appointments of Judge Owen and Judge Pickering to the Fifth Circuit on 
10-9 party-line ballots after extremely divisive hearings and rancorous 
committee interchange, although the Senate might have confirmed both 
jurists. 95 When the panel voted against Judge Owen, the Chief Executive 
asserted this was "bad for the country" and bad for the courts, while 
American citizens and the Chief Executive did not "appreciate it one bit."96 
The committee accorded Third Circuit Judge Brooks Smith rather 
analogous treatment, yet he eventually won a panel ballot 12-7 and 
confirmation 64-35. 97 
Democratic legislators reiterated public announcements that the chamber 
would quickly approve designees who had superb qualifications and centrist 
viewpoints, and the lawmakers honored this pledge across 2002. Illustrative 
of this point were Judges Richard Clifton, Julia Gibbons, Jeffrey Howard, 
Terrence O'Brien, and Reena Raggi, who felicitously secured 
appointment. 98 
Despite the considerable energy that the Senate and the administration 
committed to appellate selection, the process marginally improved 
throughout 2002. At the end of the 107th Congress and Bush's initial half 
term, empty seats were almost as ubiquitous as they had been prior to this 
Congress and the Bush Administration. 99 
When the next Senate commenced in early 2003, Republicans held a thin 
51-48-1 majority. 100 On January 7, President Bush nominated once more the 
lawyers tendered for appellate vacancies during his first two years and 
95. Albert R. Hunt, The Politics of Lifetime Appointments, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2002, at 
A19; Neil A. Lewis, Democrats Reject Bush Pick in Battle Over Court Balance, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 6, 2002, at Al; see CHARLES PICKERING, A PRICE Too HIGH: THE JUDICIARY IN JEOPARDY 
(2007); Sheldon Goldman, Unpicking Pickering in 2002: Some Thoughts on the Politics of 
Lower Federal Court Selection and Confirmation, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 695, 696 (2003). 
96. Dewar, supra note 3; see also Charles Hurt, Senate Panel OKs Owen for Judgeship, 
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2003, at A6. 
97. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S7651 (2002); Audrey Hudson, Senate Confirms Nominee 
to Court, Bush Gets Delay on Other Bench Pick, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2002, at A3; see also 
Jack Newfield, The Right's Judicial Juggernaut, THE NATION, Oct. 7, 2002, at 11; Neil A. 
Lewis, Panel Approves Bush Appeals Court Pick, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2002, at A19. See 
generally infra note 191 and accompanying text. 
98. See Nominations to U.S. Courts of Appeals, supra note 89; see also supra notes 73-74 
and accompanying text; infra notes 143, 159, 161 and accompanying text. 
99. Nominations to U.S. Courts of Appeals, supra note 89; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (December 1, 2002), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/archives/02-1201/list.pdf; supra note 37 and accompanying 
text; see supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
100. U.S. Senate Historical Office, Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present, 
http://senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one _item_ and_ teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 
2009). 
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suggested no prospects for certain unoccupied judgeships, yet in March 
only seven lacked nominees. 101 Appointments remained highly partisan and 
bitterly contested, even as the GOP adopted changes meant to improve the 
process. For example, Senator Hatch, who assumed the Judiciary 
chairmanship after a nineteen-month interlude, promptly conducted appeals 
court hearings, while Senator Bill Frist (R-Tenn.), the new Majority Leader, 
effectuated procedures to accelerate floor votes and debates, when 
required. 102 The speed at which the Chair afforded hearings precipitated 
vociferous Democratic charges about the little time for reviewing nominees. 
Instructive of this practice was the January provision of a single hearing for 
three controversial attorneys whom the earlier Congress had minimally 
analyzed, behavior of the Chair that triggered Democrats' vehement 
objections, resulting in a ten-hour session. 103 The panel also granted others 
whom that Senate neglected to assess hearings and votes. 104 
The filibuster which prevented Miguel Estrada's D.C. Circuit 
appointment, however, stalled ballots and debates on the floor. The 
controversy about naming him to this court of appeals, which is considered 
the second most important American tribunal because of the essential 
national questions that it resolves, 105 continued across 2003. The dispute's 
mix of judicial politics, selection norms, chamber traditions, and race, as 
well as high stakes-which implicated the D.C. Circuit, whose active 
members constituted equal numbers of Democratic and Republican 
appointees, and an ostensible High Court vacancy-slowed the appellate 
101. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 38; see also Jonathan Groner, 
Judiciary Battles Start Anew, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 15, 2003, at 10. After the GOP's 2002 Senate 
win, the Democrats, to keep goodwill, confirmed controversial Fourth and Tenth Circuit Judges 
Dennis Shedd and Michael McConnell. See, e.g., Richard Simon, Senate OKs Long-Delayed 
Appeals Court Nomination, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2002, at A22; Full Senate Approves Appeals 
Court Nominee, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2002, at Al4. 
102. Helen Dewar & Mike Allen, Frist Seeks to End Nominees Impasse; Majority Leader's 
Plan Would Limit Tactics Used in Senate to Block Judicial Picks, WASH. POST, May 9, 2003, at 
A12, available at http://infoweb.newsbank.com.ezproxyl.lib.asu.edu/iw-
search/we/lnfo Web?p _product= A WNB&p _theme=aggregated5&p _ action=doc&p _ docid=OF A 
EE4AE624309 A8&p _ docnum=41 &p _ queryname=2. 
103. See, e.g., Helen Dewar, Republicans Push Speedy Action on Court Picks, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 30, 2003, at A7; Jonathan Groner, Hatch Off to a Fast Start on Judges, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 
3, 2003, at 14; Neil A. Lewis, G.O.P Links Judicial Nominees to Thwart Opponents, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2003, at A21. 
104. Illustrative are Ninth Circuit appointee Jay Bybee and Tenth Circuit appointee 
Timothy Tyrnkovich. See Henry Weinstein, Conservative Confirmed as Ninth Circuit Judge, 
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2003, at B6; Editorial, Judge Tymkovich, DENVER POST, Apr. 3, 2003, at 
B6; see also Bruce Ackerman, Impeach Jay Bybee, SLATE, Jan. 13, 2009, 
http://www.slate.com/id/22085 l 7; infra note 175 and accompanying text. 
105. John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different?: A Historical View, 92 
VA. L. REV. 375, 386-87 (2006). 
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process. 106 Democrats filibustered more candidates, including Owen, 
Pickering, and Pryor, and the tactic yielded analogous effects. 107 Thus, with 
the late 2003 recess of the 108th Congress's initial session, the appeals 
courts had somewhat fewer vacancies than at its onset. 108 
Numerous elements which accompanied circuit selection this year 
persisted through 2004. In January, the Bush Administration determined 
that a valuable course of action could be to recess appoint Pickering and 
Pryor. 109 Dependence on that rarely-invoked technique exacerbated the 
circumstances, infuriating Democrats. One response that Democrats 
deployed was additional filibusters which may ultimately have led Estrada 
to withdraw. 110 A small number of judges might have received confirmation 
in 2004 because it was a presidential election year when action on judicial 
nominees customarily slows and then halts after the party conventions. 111 
106. See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Says Senate Filibuster 
Decision a "Disgrace" (Mar. 6, 2003), available at hrtp://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030306.html; see also Helen Dewar, Bush 
Calls for Limit to Senate Debates, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2003, at A4; Neil A. Lewis, Impasse 
on Judicial Pick Defies Quick Resolution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2003, at A16. See generally 
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT DEFINED 
AMERICA (2007); Samahon, supra note 7, at 784; Editorial, Judges and Justice Delayed, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 15, 2008, at A14. 
107. See Helen Dewar, Nomination of Tex. Judge is Blocked, WASH. POST, May 2, 2003, at 
A2; Neil A. Lewis, On 2nd Try, U.S. Court Nominee Advances, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2003, at 
A14; Byron York, Bored by Estrada? Owen May Prove to be a Reprise, THE HILL, Mar. 19, 
2003, at 43; infra notes 109, 185. 
108. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Jan. 8, 
2003), http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/archives/03-0108/list.pdf; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. COURTS, VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Dec. I, 2003), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/archives/03-1201/list.pdf; see also Goldman et al., supra 
note 53. 
109. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Bush Defies Democrats in Senate, Installs Judge, CHI. TRIB., 
Jan. 17, 2004, at l; Neil A. Lewis, Bypassing Senate for Second Time, Bush Seats Judge, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2004, at Al; see Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that Pryer's appointment was valid under Recess Appointments Clause), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 
942 (2005); William Ty Mayton, Recess Appointments and an Independent Judiciary, 20 
CONST. COMMENT. 515, 516 (2004). See generally United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008 
(9th Cir. 1985); Thomas A. Curtis, Recess Appointments to Article III Courts: The Use of 
Historical Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1758 (1984). 
110. See Helen Dewar, GOP Escalates Push for Nominees, WASH. POST, July 26, 2003, at 
A6, available at http://infoweb.newsbank.com.ezproxyl .lib.asu.edu/iw-
search/we/lnfo Web?p __product= A WNB&p _ theme=aggregated5&p _ action=doc&p _ docid=OFC8 
9691048AE3A4&p_docnum=l&p_queryname=5; Helen Dewar, Estrada Abandons Court Bid, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2003, at Al, http://infoweb.newsbank.com.ezproxyl.lib.asu.edu/iw-
search/we/Info Web?p __product= A WNB&p _theme=aggregated5&p _action=doc&p _ docid=OFD 
6263611085DF4&p _ docnum=2&p _ queryname=6. 
111. See Binder & Maltzman, supra note 6, at 195; Goldman, supra note 39, at 893; 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY - 108TH CONGRESS 
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Despite this limited appointments success, President Bush captured another 
term, partly by highlighting vacant judgeships, and the GOP chamber 
majority increased to 55-45. 112 
Therefore, when the 109th Senate began the ensuing year, the 
Republicans appeared poised to confirm numerous appeals court judges. 
Most of the troubling dynamics which plagued selection in the first 
administration, nonetheless, continued across the last term. For example, 
President Bush infrequently consulted senators, even from his own party, or 
assessed, much less tapped, consensus nominees, and he renominated 
attorneys whom Senate members, including a few GOP lawmakers, 
opposed. 113 This behavior led Democrats to respond with heavier 
dependence on filibusters. The tactic's use increasingly frustrated 
Republicans, who developed the "nuclear option," meant to eliminate 
reliance on filibusters when blocking judicial nominees. 114 In May, the 
"Gang of 14," comprising numerically identical Democratic and Republican 
moderate senators, averted the nuclear option's detonation by crafting an 
agreement that restricted filibuster use to "extraordinary circumstances."115 
(Dec. 1, 2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/archives/200412/current_ vacancy_ list.pdf; 
Editorial, Bench Mark, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2008, at A20. For comprehensive analysis of 
judicial selection in the 108th Congress, see Goldman et al., supra note 53. 
112. See Carl Hulse, Abortion Remark by G.O.P. Senator Puts Heat on Peers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 6, 2004 (noting that "Democratic resistance to Mr. Bush's judicial nominees was a key 
element of Republican election campaigns"), 
http://infoweb.newsbank.com.ezproxy 1.lib. asu. edu/iw-
search/we/Info W eb?p _product= A WNB&p _ theme=aggregated5&p _ action=doc&p _ docid= 1063 
275370850FF3&p_docnum=l&p_queryname=7; Neil A. Lewis, Bush Tries Again on Court 
Choices Stalled in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2004 (noting increased Republican 
representation in the Senate and that re-nomination was "in line with what had been a principal 
campaign theme for [Mr. Bush] and Vice President Dick Cheney, namely that Mr. Bush would 
battle Democratic opposition to his judicial choices."), available at 
http ://infoweb .news bank. com. ezproxy I . lib. asu.edu/iw-
search/we/Info Web?p _product= A WNB&p _theme=aggregated5&p _ action=doc&p _ docid= 1073 
378B553F8368&p_docnum=l&p_queryname=8. 
113. See Lewis, supra note 112; see also Michael A. Fletcher & Helen Dewar, Bush Will 
Renominate 20 Judges - Fights in Senate Likely Over Blocked Choices, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 
2004, at Al. 
114. See Judicial Nominations, Filibusters, and the Constitution: When a Majority is 
Denied its Right to Consent: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights 
and Property Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003), available at 
http ://www. access. gpo. gov I congress/ senate/pdf/108hrg/90460. pdf. See generally Michael J. 
Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 445 (2004); Martin B. 
Gold & Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option to Change Senate Rules and Procedures: A 
Majoritarian Means to Overcome the Filibuster, 28 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 205 (2004). 
115. Text of Senate Compromise on Nominations of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005, at A18; 
see Connie Bruck, McCain's Party, NEW YORKER, May 30, 2005, at 58; Goldman et al., supra note 
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Defusing this alternative guaranteed circuit appointment for three very 
controversial judges, Owen, Pryor and Janice Rogers Brown, and preserved 
the Senate institutionally. The Memorandum of Understanding, which the 
Gang drafted, also enabled the body to confirm numerous individuals whose 
perspectives resemble those of the three jurists. 116 
However, finding nominees for the vacancies that arose with the July 
2005 resignation of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's September death monopolized resources that would otherwise 
have been devoted to filling empty appeals court positions. 117 The actions in 
confirming John Roberts and Samuel Alito and nominating Harriet Miers 
correspondingly demanded a number of months when little appellate 
selection transpired. 118 
The circuit process, accordingly, was only reactivated the following 
February. During most of that year, continued White House aversion to 
consulting, analyzing consensus designees, and relenting on its dogmatic 
selection views apparently blocked certain nominees' approval. Indeed, the 
penchant for renominating a few candidates, such as Boyle and Haynes, 
whom even GOP legislators opposed, delayed appointments and could have 
alienated potential supporters. 119 Confirmation was also rather inexpedient 
over 2006 because that was an election year, albeit a mid-term one, during 
which Republicans lost the chamber. 120 In the end, the need to approve 
12, at 264--65; Hendrik Hertzberg, Filibluster, NEW YORKER, June 13, 2005, at 63; Samahon, supra 
note 7, at 799. 
116. Text of Senate Compromise on Nominations of Judges, supra note 115; see Goldman 
et al., supra note 12, at 261. 
117. See, e.g., Richard W. Stevenson, 0 'Connor To Retire, Touching Off Battle Over 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at Al; Linda Greenhouse, William H. Rehnquist, Architect of 
Conservative Court, Dies at 80, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at Al; Samahon, supra note 7, at 
786-800. 
118. The Senate confirmed few circuit judges during 2005-2006, when Roberts, Alito, and 
Miers were being considered. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY (2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/archives_2005.html; ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/archives_ 2006.html; see GREENBURG, supra note 8, at 
308;TOOBIN, supra note 8; GOLDMAN et al., supra note 12, at 271-73. 
119. Hansen, supra note 93; Carl Tobias, Go for Consensus Choices, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 17, 
2008, at Vol. 27, Col. 30. See Markon, supra note 4. 
120. See Christine Hauser, Concession in Virginia Race Tips Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 
2006, at Al, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/ 11 /09/us/politics/1Ovirginiacnd.html?_r=1&scp=1 &sq=novembe 
r%202006%20balance%20virginia&st=cse; Neil A. Lewis, New Democratic Majority Throws 
Bush's Judicial Nominations into Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2006, § 1, at 26; Michael 
D. Shear & Alec MacGillis, Democrats Take Control of Senate as Allen Concedes to Webb in 
Va., WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2006, at Al; see also Binder & Maltzman, supra note 6, at 195; 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY - 109TH CONGRESS 
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Supreme Court Justices may well have diverted the attention that circuit 
nominations and appointments received. 
With the January 2007 beginning of the 110th Congress, Democrats 
assumed a slim 51-49 chamber majority. 121 The White House refused to 
nominate again three people whom it had submitted multiple times, and 
observers viewed this development as a conciliatory action. 122 Nevertheless, 
President Bush consulted minimally, proposed few attorneys who were 
consensus nominees, and inflexibly addressed selection of judges. 
Virginia Fourth Circuit openings aptly epitomize these phenomena. 123 
When the l lOth Congress assembled, John Warner (R-Va.) and Jim Webb 
(D-Va.), the Commonwealth's U.S. senators, implemented a bipartisan 
process for recommending able candidates to President Bush. The 
lawmakers expeditiously identified a dozen prospects whom numerous 
Virginia bar organizations were requested to assess. 124 Those evaluated 
were intelligent, diligent, ethical, and independent and had a balanced 
temperament. Senators Warner and Webb expended considerable time 
analyzing and personally interviewing the candidates, which resulted in the 
June suggestion of five nominees they asserted were "eminently qualified": 
a U.S. District Judge, two Virginia Supreme Court Justices, a law professor, 
and an attorney. Both legislators were "fully prepared to strongly support" 
and recommend for Judiciary Committee assessment and Senate 
confirmation any on the list who might be nominated. 125 Despite this rare, 
cooperative initiative, President Bush tapped Duncan Getchell, who was not 
among the five candidates the senators proposed, three months later. 126 By 
(Dec. I, 2006), http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/archives/200612/current_ vacancy _list.pdf; 
Bench Mark, supra note 111; Goldman et al., supra note 53. For a thorough analysis of judicial 
selection in the 109th Congress, see generally Goldman et al., supra note 12. 
121 See John M. Broder, Democrats Take Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2006, at Al; Shear 
& MacGillis, supra note 120. 
122. Neil A. Lewis, Bush Drops Plans to Resubmit 3 Judicial Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
10, 2007, at Al 8; Goldman et al., supra note 12, at 261; see also VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY (2006), supra note 118. 
123. Hansen, supra note 93; Markon, supra note 4; Tobias, supra note 119. 
124. Letter to President George W. Bush from U.S. Senators John Warner and Jim Webb 
(June 12, 2007), available at http://webb.senate.gov.newsroom/record.cfm?id=290857&; see 
also Carl Tobias, Baffling Vacancy on Federal Bench, BALT. SUN, Jan. 18, 2008, at 21A. 
125. Tobias, supra note 124. 
126. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, Nominations Sent to the 
Senate (Sept. 6, 2007), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007 /09/20070906-5.html; Hansen, supra note 93, at 
42; Peter Hardin, Bush Federal Judge Pick Criticized: Getchell Was Not on Joint List of 
Nominees Favored by Sens. Warner, Webb, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 7, 2007, at B2; Jerry 
Markon, Bush's Picks for Court Spur Criticism by Warner, Webb, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2007, 
at B5; see also Shannon P. Duffy, Five Tapped for Federal Bench Openings in Pennsylvania, 
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January, Getchell had asked to withdraw, surmising that chamber approval 
was unlikely. 127 Finally, the White House nominated a very qualified judge 
from the group whom the lawmakers had compiled in the spring, and the 
jurist easily won appointment a couple of months thereafter. 128 
Additional vacancies reflect similar phenomena. The nomination to a 
Maryland Fourth Circuit opening yields helpful insights. When the 
jurisdiction's senators discovered President Bush was evaluating U.S. 
Attorney Rod Rosenstein, they chose to apprise the White House that both 
preferred he continue as U.S. Attorney; however, the legislators 
communicated the acceptability of several district judges whom GOP 
presidents had chosen, including a few Bush appointees. 129 Notwithstanding 
the Maryland overture, the Chief Executive nominated Rosenstein, and the 
Senate failed to process him. 130 President Bush analogously designated 
counsel who might assume First, Third, and Sixth Circuit vacancies in 
Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Michigan. 131 He appeared to consult 
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 25, 2008, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l202423251503 (describing similar Third Circuit 
action). 
127. See Letter from E. Duncan Getchell, Jr. to President George W. Bush (Jan. 17, 2008); 
Manu Raju, Judicial Nominee Withdraws Amid Democratic Criticism, THE HILL, Jan. 18, 2008, 
available at http://thehill.com/homenews/news/l 409 l-judicial-nominee-withdraws-amid-
democratic-criticism; see also Frank Green, Getchell Pulls Nomination as Federal Judge: Bush 
Selection for 4th Circuit Cited Long Odds He'd Get Senate Hearing, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, 
Jan. 19, 2008, at B3; Jerry Markon, 4th Circuit Nominee Withdraws Name, WASH. POST, Jan. 
19, 2008, at Al2. 
128. See Jerry Markon, U.S. Appeals Court Gets New Judge, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2008, at 
PW8; see also Jerry Markon, The Politics of the Federal Bench, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2008, at 
Al; Mike Scarcella, Obama Poised to Shift 4th Circuit to the Left, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 
22, 2008 (originally published in LEGAL TIMES). 
129. Bishop, supra note 48; Eric Rich, White House May Name Rosenstein to Appeals 
Court, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2007, at B6. 
130. Matthew Dolan, Bush Picks U.S. Attorney for Md. for 4th Circuit, BALT. SUN, Nov. 
16, 2007, at Al. See generally J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Storming the 4th Circuit, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 23, 2009, at Al 5. 
131. See, e.g., John E. Mulligan, Bumpy Ride Awaits U.S. Court Nominee, PROVIDENCE J.-
BULL., Dec. 10, 2007, at Al; Lisa Brennan, Bush Makes 3rd Circuit Pick, LEGAL TIMES, July 
23, 2007, at 8; Court Choices Offered Again, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Mar. 20, 2007, at Bl; see 
also Abramowitz, supra note 2; Erin P. Billings & John Stanton, Reid's Pledge to Move Three 
Before Recess Fails to Appease Minority, ROLL CALL, May 14, 2008, available at 
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/53_137 /news/23603-1.html [hereinafter Reid's Pledge]; Pam 
MacLean, Senate Approval of Three Circuit Court Nominees in Pipeline, NAT'L L.J., May 2, 
2008, available at 
http://quest.law.com/Search/Search.do?Ntt=%22%22Senate+to+Approve+Three+Circuit+Court 
+Nominees%22%22&x=O&y=O&Nty= 1 &N=8357 &Ntk=Sl _ All&cx=O&sortVar= 1; Erin P. 
Billings & John Stanton, A Nominations Morass, ROLL CALL, May 20, 2008, available at 
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/53 _ l 40/news/25252-1.html [hereinafter Nominations]; Neil A. 
Lewis, Deadlock on Appeals Court Judges Ends, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2008, at A19; Keith 
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nominally with lawmakers from those jurisdictions, essentially ignored 
well-qualified attorneys the legislators suggested, and eventually forwarded 
people who inspired minimal consensus. 
Judge Leslie Southwick's appointment to the Fifth Circuit also 
exemplifies the difficulties which confounded the process. 132 The jurist was 
nominated at Senator Lott's behest, although opponents claimed he was 
insensitive to matters of race and sexual orientation. After contentious 
arguments and numerous false starts, two Democratic committee members 
approved the nominee and the Senate easily confirmed him. 
Across 2007 and most of the next year, the controversy related to U.S. 
Attorney firings preoccupied the Department of Justice (DOJ), the White 
House Counsel Office, and the Senate Judiciary Committee, which have 
important selection responsibilities, and distracted the entities from their 
appointments responsibilities. 133 The battle regarding the Department's 
politicization, which ultimately evolved into a constitutional stand-off 
between the administration and lawmakers, required much time of DOJ, the 
White House Counsel, and the Judiciary Committee, efforts that invariably 
were not devoted to appointments. 134 More particularly, a number of 
chamber members and staff expended resources investigating the dispute, 
gathering applicable facts, researching the law, procuring documents, 
eliciting testimony, and issuing subpoenas, as required. Numerous 
Department and White House officials committed months to those requests 
Perine, Republican Concern over Nominee Threatens Truce on Circuit Court Choices, CQ 
TODAY, May 7, 2008. 
132. I rely in this paragraph on 153 CONG. REC. S13,273 et seq. (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2007). 
See also Peter Canellos, Fury at Vote Reflects a Politicized Process, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 30, 
2007, at 2A; David Stout, Senate Backs Disputed Judicial Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 
2007, at A21. 
133. IGLESIAS, supra note 37. Alberto Gonzales's White House Counsel experience should 
have facilitated selection, but his apparent inability to distinguish being the President's lawyer 
from the chief U.S. law enforcement officer impeded it. Philip Sherron & David Johnston, A 
Defender of Bush's Power, Gonzales Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2007, at Al; see Goldman 
et al., supra note 12, at 254-58 (showing White House and DOJ roles). 
134. Judiciary Comm. v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008); Amy Goldstein & Dan 
Eggen, Number of Fired Prosecutors Grows, WASH. POST, May 10, 2007, at Al; Carrie 
Johnson, At Justice, New Pressure to Release Documents, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2008, at A3, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/story/2008/04/07 /ST2008040702926.html; Joe Palazzolo, Court Grants Obama 
(Another) Extension in Subpoena Case, THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 23, 2009; David Stout, 
White House Aides Can Be Subpoenaed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/01/washington/O1 SUBPOENA.html. 
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and negotiations over them, and a multitude of upper-level Department and 
White House appointees resigned. 135 
In the 2008 presidential election year, some conventions obtained. 
Illustrative was appointments' comparatively lethargic pace before the 
voting. As is traditional, the Chief Executive designated rather few 
attorneys for chamber investigation, while the Judiciary panel offered 
dwindling numbers of hearings. 136 Several lawyers received approval, but 
the comparison with additional presidential election years was vigorously 
disputed. 137 Republicans threatened to impede Senate business and even halt 
operations. 138 Indicative of those machinations was a pact between chamber 
leaders that the Senate would approve three appellate court nominees before 
the Memorial Day recess. 139 When they differed about the concord's 
specifics, it nearly unraveled, and party relations gradually deteriorated, a 
phenomenon acutely revealed with Democrats' resort to pro forma sessions 
that denied candidates recess appointments. 140 Thus, courts of appeals had 
considerably more judges by the administration's conclusion than when it 
opened, although confirmations necessitated the most time historically. 141 
135. Eggen, supra note 37; Johnson, supra note 134; Shenon & Johnston, supra note 133; 
see Blumenthal, supra note 53. 
136. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2008), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/archives_2008.html; Judges and Justice Delayed, supra 
note 106. 
137. Compare 154 CONG. REc. S6892-01 (daily ed. July 17, 2008) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy) with id. at S6895-02 (statement of Sen. Specter), available at 2008 WL 2775967. 
138. Chris Casteel, Coburn Criticizes Court Vacancies, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 10, 
2008, at 9A; Keith Perine, GOP Senators Threaten Blockade, CQ. TODAY, Apr. 10, 2008; Alex 
Bolton, Under Fire from Conservatives, McConnell Hassles Democrats, THE HILL, June 19, 
2008, http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/under-fire-from-conservatives-mcconnell-hassles-
democrats-2008-06-19 .html. 
139. See Abramowitz, supra note 1; Billings & Stanton, supra note 131; MacLean, supra 
note 131. 
140. See Nominations, supra note 131; Lewis, supra note 131; Perine, supra note 131. 
141. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2009), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/archives.cfm [hereinafter VACANCIES 2009]; VACANCIES 
2001, supra note 41; Denis Rutkus & Maureen Bearden, Nominations to Article III Lower 
Courts by President George W. Bush During the llOth Congress (CRS 2008); see Pedro Ruz 
Gutierrez & Carrie Levine, Stalemate over Judicial Nominations Dampens Bush Legacy, LEGAL 
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2008, available at 
http://www.law .corn/j sp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ .j sp ?id=90000 5 5 60752&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1 ; Al 
Kamen, Judge, Not, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2008, at Al5, available at 
http://www. washingtonpost.corn/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/08/05/ AR2008080502895 .html ?nav=emailpage; R. Jeffrey Smith, A 
Bench More White, Male and Conservative, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2008, at A6, available at 
http://www. washingtonpost.corn/wp-dyn/ content/ article/2008/ 12/07 I AR20081207024 25 .html; 
see also supra notes 3 7, 99, 108, 111, 13 7 and accompanying text. 
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In sum, this analysis of circuit appointments finds that the persistent 
vacancies conundrum and the existing dilemma apparently continued to 
restrict appellate justice and these problems warrant careful treatment. The 
last segment, accordingly, canvasses numerous practices which the 
branches may use when they address the selection concerns. 
Ill. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
A. The Executive Branch and the Senate 
President Obama, as well as Democratic and GOP senators need to 
institute and apply concepts that enhance appointments. 142 For instance, the 
Chief Executive, aides who recruit judges, chamber members, and the 
body's personnel ought to streamline the duties they fulfill while 
assiduously calculating thorough investigation of attorney qualifications 
with expeditious consideration. 
The administration and senators must frontally combat, and undertake 
initiatives that will reduce, growing politicization and appreciate that its 
limitation will be very controversial and difficult to achieve. Executive and 
chamber officers should work together, reconcile disparate viewpoints, 
anticipate a number of polarizing conflicts before they surface, and adopt 
constructive responses to disputes which in fact arise. The Republican and 
Democratic parties must also end or curtail specific actions, namely 
intimating that the opposition's members are uncooperative, which could be 
perceived as gamesmanship or ways of securing near-term advantage. To 
the extent that politicization can impair appointments and motivate federal 
officials to elevate immediate partisan benefit over the welfare of the courts 
and the nation, the activity might undercut citizen respect for those having 
selection duties and even judges. 
These notions apply to the circuit system and individual appellate 
tribunals. For example, the President must increase cooperation with elected 
officers in all regions. A useful idea on which the Chief Executive should 
always depend is consultation - that is, requesting informally the officials' 
guidance before actual nomination. Explicit consultation or similar actions 
which implicated members from California, Hawaii, and New York may 
142. See supra note 7. The perennial dilemma's best remedy may be approving enough new 
seats to grant the courts all judgeships that are authorized today. This would avoid some 
theoretical, pragmatic, and legal issues. Tobias, supra note 5, at 569-70. Other ideas may only 
limit basically irreducible time restraints. For many relevant concepts, see id. at 552-73. For a 
provocative approach, see Samahon, supra note 7. 
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have accelerated chamber approval for Ninth and Second Circuit judges, 143 
even while President Bush's abbreviated consultation, or discounting the 
advice received, might have slowed or terminated the nomination or 
confirmation of a few designees. 144 The unfilled appellate court judgeships 
at the close of the Bush Administration also constitute a great opportunity to 
seek this help. Therefore, appointments officers must clearly and thoroughly 
communicate before and after nominations. 
Lawmakers who come from the states in all courts of appeals ought to 
cooperate with the President and one another regarding significant matters, 
namely whether legislators will honor the conventions that appellate judges 
should have practiced and lived where vacancies originate and maintain 
chambers there. 145 When a seat becomes empty, the jurisdictions' 
lawmakers need to propose multiple, highly qualified designees for the 
administration. Closely related to this idea is delineating talented attorneys 
for intractable or lengthy openings, such as those which remained during 
George W. Bush's presidency and exist in the Fourth Circuit. The new 
administration and senators concomitantly ought to explore assembling 
intrastate merit selection panels that resemble the Circuit Judge Nominating 
Commission adopted by President Jimmy Carter, 146 the analogous entity 
that Michigan legislators broached in 2001, 147 or the district panel that 
143. Carlos Bea and Richard Clifton were the Ninth, and Reena Raggi and Richard Wesley 
the Second Circuit judges. David G. Savage, Bush Court Nominee is Voted Down, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 6, 2002, at A 17; District Judge Raggi Gets Big Promotion, NEWSDA Y, Sept. 21, 2002, at 
A12; Politics Hinders Senate Confirmation Process, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., May 12, 2002, at 
B6; supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. 
144. Peter Keisler for the Fourth, and former Rep. Christopher Cox (R-Cal.) for the Ninth, 
Circuit illustrate designees Bush failed to nominate. See supra note 49 and accompanying text; 
see also infra note 163 and accompanying text. The factors in the text might explicate Senate 
delay on a number of Bush's Michigan Sixth Circuit nominees and several Fourth Circuit 
nominees. See supra notes 12-13, 91, 123-28 and accompanying text; infra notes 158, 165-66, 
188-89 and accompanying text. 
145. Chamber opposition to Fourth Circuit nominees Claude Allen and Rod Rosenstein 
illustrates this. See Mike Allen, Virginian Picked for 4th Circuit Judgeship, WASH. POST, Apr. 
29, 2003, at B 1 ; Letter from Alberto Gonzales, White House Counsel, to Sen. Barbara Mikulski 
(D-Md.) & Sen. Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.) (July 17, 2003) (on file with author); Letter from Sens. 
Mikulski & Sarbanes to Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) & Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) (July 11, 
2003) (on file with author); supra notes 129-30, 144 and accompanying text. 
146. See, e.g., LARRY C. BERKSON & SUSAN B. CARBON, THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT 
JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSION: ITS MEMBER, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES (1980); Elaine 
Martin, Gender and Judicial Selection: A Comparison of the Reagan and Carter 
Administrations, 71 JUDICATURE 136, 140 (1987); see also GERHARDT, supra note 8, at 9, 119-
20, 146-47; GOLDMAN, supra note 8, at 238-50, 260-61, 267-68, 270, 274, 290. See generally 
supra note 80 (affording a new ABA suggestion for panels). 
147. Sens. Carl Levin & Debbie Stabenow, Bipartisanship Can End Judge Stalemate, 
GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Dec. 5, 2001, at A15; Editorial, Empty Chairs on the Bench, GRAND 
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President Bush and the California senators effectuated that year and relied 
on for his administration's duration. 148 This kind of group would improve 
Fourth Circuit appointments and has the potential to rectify stalemates 
because the entity increases consensus and Democrats essentially possess a 
somewhat narrow majority. The relatively similar initiative assembled by 
the Virginia lawmakers is a constructive paradigm that warrants serious 
exploration. 149 Finally, if these and other ideas do not ameliorate the 
selection conundrum, the administration and the chamber must redouble 
attempts to break logjams on the Fourth Circuit and additional tribunals and 
could even investigate provocative approaches which decrease the 
confirmation stakes by altering judicial life tenure. 150 
B. The Executive Branch 
Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush share analogous, partial 
responsibility for today's circumstances. 151 The Obama Administration 
should enunciate lucid, comprehensive goals, and devise salutary means for 
realizing the objectives, as well as announce the concepts at a national 
venue to inform appointments' participants and citizens. For example, merit 
should be the touchstone, yielding nominees who are intelligent, diligent, 
RAPIDS PRESS, Nov. 27, 2001, at A12; see John Wagner, Panel Would Suggest Nominees, 
RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, June 19, 2002, at B5 (assessing a North Carolina Bar Association 
proposal to create a similar entity); York, supra note 91. 
148. Carla Marinucci, Feinstein, Boxer Given a Say Over Judges Bush Forms 1st 
Bipartisan Panel to Fill U.S. Court Seats in State, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 27, 2001, at A3, available 
at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2001/04/27/MN112069 .DTL; Henry 
Weinstein, Process of Judge Selection for Courts, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 2001, at B 1; see Bob 
Egelko, Feinstein Taps Bipartisan Panels to Pick Judges, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 5, 2009, available 
at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/01/04/BA9N 152UDJ .DTL. 
149. Supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text; see infra note 152 (analyzing Hatch's 
efforts). 
150. Were tenure changes constitutional, their detriments, namely for judicial 
independence, may outweigh the benefits. Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits 
for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 769 (2006); 
Roger C. Cramton, Reforming the Supreme Court, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1313 (2007); Robert Barnes, 
Legal Experts Propose Limiting Justices' Powers, Terms, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2009, at A15, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/02/22/AR2009022201863.html. Less conventional notions, including 
"trades,'' might be warranted. See Slotnick, supra note 7, at 242; supra notes 139-41; infra 
notes 185-89 and accompanying text. 
151. In early 1997 and 2001, Clinton and Bush sent few nominees; many apparently were 
talented centrists, but Hatch and Leahy claimed that some were not. See supra notes 40-44, 47-
49 and accompanying text. At the outset, the President might solicit advice of former 
appointments officials. See Carl Tobias, Dear President Bush: Leaving a Legacy on the Federal 
Bench, 42 U. RICH. L. REv.1041, 1051 n.43 (2008). 
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ethical, independent, and who have balanced temperament. The President 
must also recognize and explain White House and DOJ staff duties and 
explain how to use the input on prospects by legislators from states that 
experience vacant positions. For instance, recent administrations' White 
Houses jealously safeguarded their constitutional prerogatives to name all 
Supreme Court and many appellate nominees while deferring to particular 
senators on most trial court openings because consultation with home-state 
lawmakers is valuable, as it facilitates approval. 
The Chief Executive needs to proffer sufficient able, centrist attorneys 
for the district bench whom the Judiciary panel may scrutinize, and 
nominate capable individuals for the appeals courts at a pace that will 
expedite Senate analysis. Cultivation of the leadership will be imperative 
because the Judiciary Chair assumes responsibility for panel evaluations, 
hearings, and votes and the Majority Leader controls floor access, while 
both negotiate over critical questions, including filibuster deployment and 
time allocation with the GOP leadership. 
President Obama should be cautious, as missteps early in the nascent 
administration's tenure will erode credibility, impede selection, and perhaps 
jeopardize appointments. If the circuits operate with accomplished members 
and no vacancies, the bench will fairly and expeditiously treat the growing 
and increasingly complex criminal actions, reduce the civil backlogs of 
district courts and promptly terminate appeals. 
The Chief Executive should first assess and institute conciliatory 
measures because those remedies are generally efficacious and, if the 
practices are not effective, selection officials can depend on their 
application to justify implementing confrontational approaches later. The 
President could employ mechanisms that streamline the performance of 
administration responsibilities. A cogent illustration is assembling (1) 
designees for each court of appeals and High Court vacancy, which drains 
limited appellate resources, particularly for openings like Fourth Circuit 
seats that will engender paybacks over the restricted analysis given 
President Bush's nominees, and (2) GOP senators who have cooperated 
with Democrats, a phenomenon manifested by the Hatch proposals for 
justices and the nominees' appointment in the Clinton Administration. 152 
152. ORRIN HATCH, SQUARE PEG: CONFESSIONS OF A CITIZEN SENATOR 129 (2002); see 
Senate Judiciary Comm. Exec. Business Mtg. (June 12, 2008) (showing Hatch was lone GOP 
panel member favoring Judge White); Tobias, supra note 151, at 1049 (analyzing High Court 
"short list"); supra text accompanying notes 123-28 (assessing Fourth Circuit seats); supra 
notes 144--46 and accompanying text (urging the President to improve process by consulting 
panel and senators and using merit selection group). 
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The Chief Executive should initiate actions that will enhance gender, 
ethnic, and ideological diversity. Fruitful concepts which other presidents 
adopted offer helpful beginnings. For example, President Carter applied 
merit selection panels, while Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton 
requested that senators identify numbers of very able female designees. 153 
The Chief Executive ought to approach less conventional groups, such as 
political organizations for women and minorities, that are knowledgeable 
about candidates. Moreover, the President ought to rely on female and 
minority lawmakers, who should ask their colleagues to delineate, and help 
confirm, additional women and people of color. Increasing gender and 
ethnic diversity will offer several benefits. Numerous female and minority 
appointees will help other jurists understand and efficaciously resolve 
complicated issues, namely discrimination and abortion, 154 which are issues 
the courts must face while limiting gender and racial bias in the justice 
system. 155 The public also has greater confidence in appellate and district 
judges who reflect the nation's composition. 156 
The Obama Administration as well might evaluate nominating 
individuals who may expand political diversity. The administration should 
search for nominees with minimalist perspectives on the Constitution and 
statutory interpretation and even seek out attorneys who could appreciate 
the notion of a "living Constitution."157 The President might justify this 
153. See Tobias, supra note 33, at 479-80 (assessing Bush's request); Neil A. Lewis, 
Unmaking the G.O.P. Court Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1993, at AlO, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/ 1993/08/23/us/unmaking-the-gop-court-legacy .html (assessing 
Clinton's request); see also sources cited supra note 146 (assessing Carter's panels). 
154. See, e.g., Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 .ARiz. L. REV. 9, 19-21, 25-27, 31-33 
(2001); Marion Zenn Goldberg, Carter-Appointed Judges Perspectives on Gender, TRIAL, 
Apr. 1990, at 108; see also Theresa M. Beiner, The Elusive (But Worthwhile) Quest for a 
Diverse Bench in the New Millennium, 36 U.C. DAVlS L. REV. 597, 599-600, 610-17 (2003); 
Sheldon Goldman, Should There Be Affirmative Action for the Judiciary?, 62 JUDICATURE 488, 
491 (1979). 
155. See, e.g., NINTH CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL, RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC FAIRNESS, 
FINAL REPORT (1997); FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITTEE 169-70 (1990). See generally Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts: An 
Emerging Focus for Judicial Reform, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 237, 238 (1989). 
156. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, A Profile of Carter's Judicial Nominees, 62 JUDICATURE 
246, 253 (1978); Editorial, The O'Connor Court, WASH. POST, July 2, 2005, at A28. But see 
Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Corifidence, 
57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405 (2000). 
157. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (2005); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN 
ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005); ROSEN, supra 
note 106; sources cited supra note 8. But see Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (Amy Gutmann, ed., 1997); Curt Levey, Living Constitution, 
R.I.P., NAT'L REv. ONLINE, Sept. 30, 2005, 
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=ZDhmNjB10TklNDkONDJjOGEzOWE1YjY5MjdkZTAO 
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selection approach because, for instance, his predecessor essentially named 
strict constructionists, originalists, and ideological conservatives while GOP 
appointees comprise majorities on virtually all circuits. Therefore, the 
election arguably gave the new leader a mandate to rectify imbalance and 
non-diverse viewpoints. However, unduly emphasizing ideology may 
provoke criticisms like the aspersions which Republicans and Democrats 
cast on each other's administrations. 
President Obama reassessed and reversed President Bush's decision to 
delete ABA review in advance of nominations, as eliminating the group's 
input at that phase has slowed confirmation, while this examination often 
improves appointments through detection of potentially embarrassing 
information that the White House can lack. 158 Another useful option would 
be selecting more counsel whom Republicans will deem acceptable. For 
example, President Bush recommended Circuit Judge Parker, who was 
initially appointed by President Clinton to the Southern District of New 
York, and the jurist was felicitously approved. 159 Elevation is 
correspondingly a productive remedy because most district judges who are 
submitted for appeals court vacancies prompt little opposition. 160 President 
Reagan actually named to the trial bench Julia Gibbons, who was the first 
individual President Bush placed on the Sixth Circuit, which had long 
addressed confirmation difficulties. 161 
Yjc=. Bush also emphasized youth, so the new President may wish to as well. Goldman, supra 
note 12, at 260. 
158. See, e.g., Terry Carter, Do-Over: After an Eight-Year Pause, the ABA is Again Vetting 
Possible Federal Bench Nominees, A.B.A. J., May 2009, at 62, available at 
http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/do-over/; Editorial, supra note 52; see also David Ingram, 
What Role Will ABA Have in Judicial Nominations?, THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, 
available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/elert/what_role_will_aba_have_injudicial_nominations/ 
; Leahy Statement, supra note 53. See generally supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. 
159. Parker easily won confirmation, as he was appointed once, had Democratic support, 
and had been a district judge, which informed Senate review. Parker's elevation resembled that 
by Clinton of Judge Sonia Sotomayor whom Bush's father chose. See Neil A. Lewis, After 
Delay, Senate Approves Judge for Court in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1998, at B23, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/03/nyregion/after-delay-senate-approves-judge-
for-court-in-new-york.html; see also supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
160. Recent presidents used elevation. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Bush Picking the Kind of 
Judges Reagan Favored, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1990, at Al, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/ 1990/04/ 1 O/us/bush-picking-the-kind-of-judges-reagan-favored.html; 
Ruth Marcus, Bush Quietly Fosters Conservative Trend, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1991, at Al4; 
Tobias, supra note 54, at 752. But see supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. 
161. James Brosnan, Senate Confirms Gibbons 95-0 for Appeals Bench, MEMPHIS COM. 
APPEAL, July 30, 2002, at B2; Editorial, At Last, A Beginning, CINCINNATI POST, July 31, 2002, 
at 12A; see also UK Professor Confirmed to Appeals Court, LOUISVILLE COURIER-I., Nov. 12, 
2002, at 1; supra note 49. 
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The administration could even think about sending capable lawyers with 
GOP affiliations. 162 This idea might be efficacious for circuits that have 
protracted openings, resolve large numbers of appeals, or include states 
where the party that lacks Executive Branch control usually wins. 
Instructive during the Bush years was Maryland. Maryland lawmakers 
prevented selection of a Republican designee and a nominee's appointment 
because the White House failed to consult the legislators and one nominee 
practiced law minimally in Maryland and the second had not. 163 
Explanations regarding perennial fights between Democrats and 
Republicans indicate why Michigan Sixth Circuit positions had no judges 
over a decade. 164 For appellate courts with multiple, lengthy vacancies and 
numerous appeals - that are in jurisdictions where elected officers, who 
suggest or may block nominations, cannot agree - the President might 
consider "trades," namely allowing Republican designation of some 
prospects. 165 
Illuminating was the proposal by Michigan senators to favor the 
attorneys the Bush Administration submitted for openings when President 
Clinton's nominees from Michigan received analysis. 166 The huge caseload 
growth since 1990, when a thorough judgeships bill last passed, also merits 
new seats; the President could exchange a judgeship for GOP suggestions of 
a few candidates, thus instituting a bipartisan judiciary and possibly 
162. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. See generally supra notes 74, 159 and 
accompanying text; infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
163. Carl Tobias, The Bush Administration and Appeals Court Nominees, IO WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 103, 110, 114 (2001); Lewis, supra note 38; see supra notes 48, 129-30 and 
accompanying text. 
164. Jonathan Groner & Jonathan Ringel, Judicial Nominee Horsetrading Heats Up as 
Confirmation Process Gets Weighed, AM. LAW. MEDIA, Aug. 31, 2001, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005521522; Jerry Markon, The Politics of the 
Federal Bench, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2008, at A 1, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/07 I AR2008120702703 .html; 
Senate Nomination Process Needs Repair, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 4, 2002, at A8; The Federal 
Court Blockade, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, May 12, 2002; supra notes 12, 91, 140, 147 and 
accompanying text; infra note 166 and accompanying text. 
165. In 1997, Senator Biden said that the GOP had earlier mentioned a similar "informal 
agreement," yet this idea violated a 200-year tradition. 143 CONG. REC. S2538, S2541 (daily ed. 
Mar. 19, 1997); see sources cited supra note 47. "Horsetrading" judgeships is controversial. See 
Groner & Ringel, supra note 164; see also GERHARDT, supra note 8, at 157-63; Slotnick, supra 
note 7, at 242. 
166. Levin & Stabenow, supra note 147; Egan & Trowbridge, supra note 12; sources cited 
supra notes 12, 91, 147. Senator Edwards analogously delayed opposing Judge Boyle, until he 
could speak with Bush about naming a Clinton nominee. Matthew Cooper & Douglas Waller, 
Bush's Judicial Picks Could Be a Battle Boyle, TIME, May 21, 2001, at 22; see also supra notes 
13, 49; infra note 185 and accompanying text. 
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correcting the present dynamics. 167 The administration could even reach 
accords with the Judiciary Committee leaders on a prearranged number of 
nominees to be approved in a session. 168 
The Chief Executive, who has practiced bipartisanship, must initially 
exhaust all conciliatory notions. Only if they fail should the White House 
evaluate, and perhaps adopt, rather confrontational tools. For instance, the 
administration might deploy the office essentially as a bully pulpit to shame 
or castigate Republican actions, including filibusters of circuit nominees. 
President Obama may aggressively force the judicial selection question by 
taking it to the public or considering vacancies an election issue, as the 
GOP has successfully done. Analogous options include the nomination of 
counsel for all current empty positions or the selective use of recess 
appointments, initiatives that help leverage the chamber through publicizing 
or dramatizing how sustained vacancies undercut appellate justice. 
President Clinton apparently facilitated Judge Gregory's confirmation by 
recess appointing the lawyer; however, this situation was exceptional. The 
jurist was the Fourth Circuit's initial African-American member and no 
Chief Executive after Carter had invoked the device for bench 
appointments, while critical political, legal, and practical factors restrict its 
effectiveness, as shown by the dispute that involved Judge Pickering's 
elevation. 169 President Bush relied on, or threatened use of, similar ideas 
mainly when pressuring Democrats but generally applied them with caution 
and attempted to retain a dignified selection process, although a number of 
the ideas that he employed were inefficacious and even counterproductive, 
as reflected in unsuccessful Fourth Circuit appointments. 170 
Those concepts examined implicate each appeals court and the appellate 
system. For instance, consultation has frequently been advantageous and 
has entailed inconsequential political costs. To the extent its abbreviated 
167. Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 29, at 271; see Tobias, supra note 151, at 1045 n.21, 
1052 nn.49-52 (case and work load data). But see id. at 1052 n.51; GRASSLEY REPORT, supra 
note 67, at 1-15. 
168. Variations on ideas above are senators' provision of lawyers who meet presidential 
criteria or of alternating suggestions in states with both parties' senators. Michael J. Gerhardt, 
Judicial Selection as War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 688 (2003). I am not urging the ideas' 
adoption, but the President should analyze them and be pragmatic. He may assess how critical 
openings are and conclude filling them is less crucial than some principles, such as naming the 
type of jurists he prefers. 
169. Putative appointees often decline appointment, while the device inflames opponents 
and raises constitutional issues, such as the effect of Judge Pickering's service as a recess 
appointee on cases that he resolved. See sources cited supra note 109; see also supra notes 74, 
140 and accompanying text. 
170. See, e.g., President's Remarks, supra note 40; Lewis, supra note 74; sources cited 
supra notes 55, 123-28; see also supra notes 13, 94, 122, 129-30, 166 and accompanying text. 
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use, or eschewing the guidance furnished, has slowed candidates, the 
administration should broach counsel with the officers and assign their 
input greater value. Had President Bush contacted Democratic legislators 
from specific jurisdictions about possibilities under consideration, he would 
have anticipated, and could have reduced, the difficulties that arose when 
the lawmakers objected. 171 The Chief Executive should also remember that 
concerns about the ideological perspectives of these and other candidates, 
which essentially stalled nomination, analysis, and confirmation. Insofar as 
their views and those held by additional circuit designees triggered effective 
interest group opposition, prolonging appointments and fostering occasional 
rejection, the President might consider less doctrinaire nominees or be 
realistic about how the entities can affect confirmation. 172 The 
administration should concomitantly avoid mechanisms which continue and 
aggravate the detrimental payback cycle. Illustrations include President 
Bush's 2003 re-nomination of Judge Pickering, although the committee did 
not favor him the year before, and the jurist's 2004 recess appointment, 
measures that seemingly prompted Democrats to block his confirmation and 
that of other nominees with filibusters. The Chief Executive and the 
chamber analogously treated several Fourth Circuit prospects. 
C. The Senate 
All Senate members need to analyze and institute cooperative 
approaches, as the body shares responsibility with Presidents Clinton and 
George W. Bush for appellate openings today. GOP legislators should keep 
in mind that Democrats approved larger numbers of judges, despite 
politicized selection, when Republicans occupied the White House; 173 that 
citizens may actually blame the GOP for the complications which 
protracted vacancies impose; and that Democrats again hold the upper 
chamber. 174 
171. See supra notes 12-13, 48, 83, 91, 93, 143-45, 163-66; infra notes 185-89 and 
accompanying text. 
172. Others were Michigan, Ohio, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuit nominees. See Neil A. 
Lewis, Bush Judicial Choice Imperiled by Refusal to Release Papers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 
2002, at A28; David Savage, Despite Own Views, Nominee Would Back "Roe," L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 19, 2002, at Al3; Jonathan Groner, Abortion Returns to Nominations Stage, LEGAL TIMES, 
July 22, 2002, at l; GERHARDT, supra note 8, at 217-29; GOLDMAN, supra note 8, at 310-11; 
supra notes 12, 49, 91, 93-96, 152 and accompanying text. 
173. See supra notes 54, 57-58 and accompanying text; see also Hartley & Holmes, supra 
note 28. 
174. See sources cited supra notes 38, 55, 77-80. See generally Newfield, supra note 97, at 
11-16. 
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Republican senators, accordingly, ought to embrace conciliatory devices. 
These lawmakers should be responsive if Democrats propose the filibuster's 
replacement with thorough substantive debate on nominee qualifications. 
Moreover, the lawmakers should be receptive to administration consultation 
by proffering frank, instructive advice and should rather quickly confirm 
President Bush's district appointees whom his successor might elevate and 
other, talented consensus nominees. GOP legislators should apply a plethora 
of similar cooperative approaches. For instance, when Republicans believe 
presidential designees are unpalatable, the lawmakers could recommend 
attorneys they find to be better. 175 The Senate may correspondingly wish to 
assess proposals for enhancing various stages in the process that President 
Bush championed across his first term. Certain ideas, namely making active 
judges give earlier notice that they intend to become senior jurists and less 
flexible time periods for many phases, essentially violate longstanding 
judicial and senatorial conventions or are infeasible. 176 
To the extent delayed nominee investigation has allowed prolonged 
vacancies, the Senate might canvass numerous efficacious ways of 
facilitating appointments. The Judiciary panel could grant more lawyers 
hearings and votes with relatively narrow analysis, a technique which 
Senator Hatch deployed in 2003, while the committee may abolish 
ceremonial sessions for noncontroversial people. Insofar as legislators 
might have failed to expedite attorneys because of their ideological 
outlooks, venerated norms, and recent practice suggest those forwarded 
deserve committee hearings and votes. 177 The Majority Leader ought to use 
175. Washington Senators Slade Gorton (R) and Patty Murray (D) proposed designees in 
1997, as have Nevada Senators John Ensign (R) and Harry Reid (D) since 2001 and Virginia 
Senators since 2007. See Callaghan, supra note 47; 149 CONG. REc. S3678 et seq. (daily ed. 
Mar. 13, 2003) (statements of Sens. Ensign & Reid); supra notes 123-28 and accompanying 
text. Senator Reid should resolve disputes and seek help from Senators Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), 
the current ranking panel member, and Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), the current Minority Leader. 
176. Exec. Order No. 13,300, 68 Fed. Reg. 25,807 (May 9, 2003); see Bermant et al., supra 
note 5, at 334; Mike Allen & Amy Goldstein, Bush Has Plan to Speed Judicial Confirmations, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2002, at A21 (on file with author); Edwin Chen & Henry Weinstein, 
Liberals Bracing for Quick Judicial Action by Bush, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2002, at A22, 
available at http:/18.12.42.31/2002/nov/07 /nation/na-judges7. For later similar ideas, see S. Res. 
327, 108th Cong. (2004); Charles Pickering, A Proposal: Codification by Statute of the Judicial 
Confirmation Process, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 807 (2006). Executive, FBI, ABA, and 
Senate scrutiny may slow nomination and confirmation. Home-state lawmakers can also block 
nominees; unanimous consent allows one senator to delay floor action and cloture requires sixty 
votes. See Tobias, supra note 151, at 1048-49. 
177. See supra notes 54, 85 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 40-44 and 
accompanying text. The 2002 party-line rejections of Judges Owen and Pickering seemingly 
were "paybacks." See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 107-09 
and accompanying text. 
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notions that encourage increased assessment by the whole chamber. For 
example, Senator Reid may promote balloting on greater numbers of 
attorneys, if the Majority Leader schedules floor consideration as soon as he 
learns about positive committee action. To the extent that controversies over 
individual nominees slow the process, the Democratic leadership should 
permit additional, robust debates and votes, especially as a filibuster 
substitute, but ostensible GOP reliance on the procedure complicates these 
initiatives; accordingly, Democrats could revitalize an entity like the "Gang 
of 14" that would allow filibusters only in exceptional circumstances. 178 
Senators also might calibrate the need for thorough analysis and prompt 
confirmation of many nominees while approving individuals with the 
expertise and character to furnish distinguished service. Republicans may 
ask whether they overemphasize ideology just as the parties could have 
scuttled the dubious efforts to ascertain if nominees of President Bush and 
President Clinton would be "judicial activists," once confirmed. 179 The 
advice and consent phrasing in Article II contemplates that senators will 
review designees' abilities, ethics, and respect for separation of powers, 180 
yet the legislators should not stymie candidates based on how putative 
appointees would decide issues' merits, as evaluation of those questions 
seems to compromise judicial independence. 181 
178. Some judges' confirmation debates were frank, useful exchanges. 144 CONG. REC. 
S11872-902 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (nomination of William Fletcher); 143 CONG. REc. S2515-
0l (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (nomination of Merrick Garland); supra note 97 (nomination ofD. 
Brooks Smith); supra note 132 (nomination of Leslie Southwick); Neil A. Lewis, After Long 
Delays, Senate Confirms 2 Judicial Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2000, at Al6, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/10/us/after-long-delays-senate-confirms-2-judicial-
nominees.html; Slotnick, supra note 7, at 240; see supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text 
(treating filibusters & Gang). 
179. See, e.g., Judicial Nominations 2001: Should Ideology Matter?: Hearings Before the 
S. Judiciary Subcommittee on Admin. Oversight & the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter 2001 Hearing]; Judicial Activism: Defining the Problem and its 
Impact: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism and Property 
Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997); 143 CONG. REC. S2515 (daily ed. 
Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also KERMIT ROOSEVELT, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM (2006); Newfield, supra note 97, at 11-16; sources cited supra notes 8, 55, 74. 
180. See, e.g., 2001 Hearing, supra note 179; Douglas Laycock, Forging Ideological 
Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at A31, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/18/opinion/18LA YC.html; see also Albert Alschuler, Making 
Ideology an Issue, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 18, 2002, at 23. See generally Stephen L. Carter, A Devilish 
Look at the Confirmation Process, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 369 (2002). 
181. See, e.g., CITIZENS FOR INDEP. COURTS, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: POLITICS AND AMERICA'S 
COURTS 1-75, 121-71, 205-42 (2000); Symposium, Judicial Independence and Accountability, 
72 S. CAL. L. REV. 311, 315-809 (1999). Many GOP members found Democrats' filibuster of 
Estrada to exemplify these ideas. See sources cited supra note 106. 
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Republicans should confirm nominees who possess qualifications 
suggesting they would be effective judges; Democrats frequently so acted 
when the party lacked control of the White House. 182 They are concerned 
about how the GOP moved few Clinton nominees, while many Republicans 
have not forgotten Judge Bork's defeat, the imbroglio over appointment of 
Justice Thomas, and the chilly reception accorded to some people President 
Bush forwarded, endeavors that the GOP contends were animated by 
opposition to individual candidates' jurisprudence. 183 Democrats and 
Republicans should abjure this pern1c10us dynamic specifically 
characterized by accelerating paybacks and forge more consensus or a 
global accord. 184 
These notions pertain to each circuit and the system. For instance, 
Republicans from areas that have encountered impasses may effectuate 
compromises or "trades." Illustrative of the first approach are the South 
Carolina lawmakers and its Fourth Circuit vacancies. They should propose 
moderate, talented attorneys Democrats would consider acceptable. 185 North 
Carolina is, and California may be, informative exemplars of nuanced 
possible trades. 186 Republicans from the jurisdictions might agree to a 
Democratic appellate candidate, if the administration supports a prospect 
182. See supra notes 54, 85 and accompanying text. See generally supra notes 40-44 and 
accompanying text. 
183. Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 29, at 256; Melone, supra note 9, at 68; Gest & Lord, 
supra note 61; see MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE (1992); sources cited supra note 
29; PAUL SIMON, ADVICE & CONSENT (1992). Democrats' actions may be distinguishable, as 
High Court selection is so critical and they rarely so assessed appellate court nominees. See 
sources cited supra note 66; see also Michael J. Gerhardt, Supreme Court Selection as War, 50 
DRAKE L. REV. 3, 93 (2002). 
184. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 163-68, 179-81; see also supra notes 49, 93-97 
and accompanying text. 
185. Rick Brundrett, Federalist Society Hopes Obama Picks Moderate Judges, THE STATE, 
Jan. 18, 2009 (on file with author); see Rick Brundrett, Columbia Man Nominated for U.S. 4th 
Circuit Judge, THE STATE, July 3, 2007, available at 
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary _ 0286-31793537 _ITM. 
186. For North Carolina, see supra notes 13, 48-49, 166 and accompanying text; infra note 
197. For California, see Howard Mintz, Bush Picks Latina for Appeals Court, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 14, 2003, at 19A, available at 
http://www.wmha.org/Issues%20News%20Articles/Hispanic%20Appointments/BUSH%20PIC 
KS%20LATINA%20FOR%20APPEALS%20COURT.htm; Henry Weinstein, Conservative 
State Judge Nominated for Federal Bench, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003, at B8, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2003/feb/14/local/me-judge14; Slotnick, supra note 7, at 242 
(assessing trades); see also 149 CONG. REC. S4604-07 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 2003) (statement of 
Sen. Leahy); Neil A. Lewis, Judicial Nominee Distances Herself From Past Positions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 2, 2003, at A16, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/02/politics/02JUDG.html; supra notes 143, 148 and 
accompanying text. 
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whom they recommend for the next opening. 187 Last year's Sixth Circuit 
vignette provides another salient example. President Bush and the Michigan 
legislators broke the deadlock which stopped him and the Clinton 
Administration from confirming anyone for two vacant positions. 188 
Senators Levin and Stabenow had intimated they would favor a Bush 
nominee, if the White House tapped one lawyer his predecessor had 
selected. 189 
D. The Judiciary 
The Constitution restricts Third Branch ability to change the present 
situation because Article II delegates the President and the Senate lead 
responsibilities for judicial selection. However, the courts may enhance 
attempts to publicize openings and the severe difficulties they create 190 
while formulating approaches to improve the process that the Chief 
Executive and the Senate implement. Particular jurists also can specifically 
request or urge lawmakers to expedite appointments. For instance, when 
Chief Judge Edward Becker asked that legislators fill Third Circuit 
vacancies, his personal importuning encouraged Senator Biden to approve a 
controversial jurist. 191 Nevertheless, this device has limited applicability, 
187. See supra notes 83, 94, 123-28, 148, 171; see also infra note 196 and accompanying 
text. 
188. See supra notes 12, 49, 91, 93, 145, 147, 161, 164-66 and accompanying text. 
Pennsylvania is similar. Duffy, supra note 126. 
189. Smith, supra note 141. My ideas rely on the existence of openings, filibusters' 
invocation, and continuing tensions. See supra notes 12, 47--49, 91, 93-94, 140, 145, 147, 164, 
171 and accompanying text. For useful ideas, compare Judicial Nomination, Filibusters and the 
Constitution, Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Constitution Subcomm., supra note 114, with 
Press Release, U.S. Senate, Schumer Proposes New Confirmation Process for Judicial 
Nominations (Apr. 30, 2003) (on file with author). 
190. The judiciary's adoption of these kinds of initiatives might enhance citizen awareness 
of, and galvanize public support to remedy, the vacancies conundrum, while the efforts may 
even heighten executive and legislative officers' sensitivity to the necessity for expediting 
judicial selection. 
191. District Judge D. Brooks Smith was the controversial Bush nominee. See Jonathan 
Groner, Stars Align for Circuit Nominee, LEGAL TIMES, May 27, 2002, at 1, available at 
http://web2.westlaw.com/result/default.wl?rltdb=CLID_DB4719755313238&srch=TRUE&db= 
ALLNEWS&sv=Split&service=Search&eq=search&fmqv=s&sskey=CLID _ SSSA8822855313 
238&method=TNC&action=Search&query=%22STARS+ ALIGN+FOR+CIRCUIT +NO MINE 
E%22&mt=208&fn= _ top&origin=Search&vr=2.0&rlt=CLID _ QRYRL T2021257313238&rp= 
%2fsearch%2fdefault.wl&cfid=l&rs=WLW7.07; see also sources cited supra note 97. 
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while some might consider the action overly political or think it 
compromises judicial independence. 192 
The views below relate to the dozen appeals courts and the system. For 
example, all judges on the tribunals should reassess whether the contingents 
that lawmakers have granted allow the circuits to dispense justice and, if 
not, precisely how much augmentation could be warranted. The Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts argued that no 
tribunals required positions, while a majority of Third, Fourth, and Eleventh 
Circuit jurists agreed with this finding. 193 Nonetheless, a study commission 
- which legislators instituted over a decade ago to evaluate and posit 
recommendations for improving the courts - ascertained that members on 
a considerably larger number of tribunals asserted the judges would 
function more efficaciously with bigger complements. 194 
The notion of optimal magnitude has provoked strong disagreement, 
particularly among jurists on the courts. 195 For instance, twelve years ago, 
Chief Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, argued that the Fourth Circuit 
performed well using a smaller number of active members than Congress 
had approved, 196 while Senator Helms capitalized on analogous propositions 
to oppose lawyers whom President Clinton tapped for seats assigned to 
North Carolina. 197 However, this appeals court's judges favorably 
responded in the highest percentages when answering commission survey 
queries about whether tribunal growth could allow the jurists to "correct 
prejudicial errors, minimize appellate litigation costs, avoid [conflicting 
192. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 179-86. See generally Lauren K. Robel, 
Impermeable Federalism, Pragmatic Silence, and the Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, 
71IND.L.J.841 (1996). 
193. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 194, 198, 202 and 
accompanying text. 
194. COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, 
WORKING PAPERS, 18-21 (1998) [hereinafter WORKING PAPERS]; see COMMISSION ON 
STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT (1998). 
Congress authorized the study in 1997 that was completed in 1998. See MILLER REPORT, supra 
note 5, at 5. 
195. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 21. See generally Gordon Bermant et al., Imposing a 
Moratorium on the Number of Federal Judges: Analysis of Arguments and Implications 
(Federal Judicial Center 1993). 
196. Hearings on Conserving Judicial Resources, supra note 68; accord GRASSLEY 
REPORT, supra note 67. 
197. David Firestone, With New Administration, Partisan Battle Resumes Over a Federal 
Appeals Bench, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2001, at Al3, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001 /05/21 /us/with-new-administration-partisan-battle-resumes-over-
a-federal-appeals-bench.html; see supra notes 13, 49, 83, 93 and accompanying text. This 
inconsistency did not preclude Helms from urging Bush to nominate Judge Boyle. See 
Firestone, supra. 
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determinations and hear sufficient] oral argument." 198 The circuit's rather 
tiny numbers of arguments and published opinions indicate the court would 
deliver additional justice, if the tribunal were larger or at full strength. 199 
Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., also found in 1998 that the Sixth 
Circuit would operate more effectively with new positions. 200 A majority of 
the tribunal's jurists asked that Congress approve seats, 201 while the circuit 
judges affirmatively reacted in the highest percentages to the questions 
whether enhanced size would help the court decrease a backlog and issue a 
"statement of reasons for all decisions in nonfrivolous" cases. 202 The few 
published opinions which the tribunal affords and its relatively slow 
disposition times reveal that the court of appeals could function better with 
additional positions. 203 Those Sixth Circuit jurists, who opposed growth, 
accordingly, might consider whether new seats would allow the tribunal to 
perform more efficaciously. 
The Judicial Conference also needs to calibrate the ideal magnitude for 
each appellate court and the system when gathering data and assembling 
congressional judgeship recommendations, although it ordinarily honors the 
preferences of every circuit's jurists.204 In the end, aggravating the 
counterproductive Democratic and Republican dynamics, which incessant 
paybacks now epitomize, and subverting appointments for immediate 
political gain are mistakes that corrode the nation's respect for the 
governmental branches. 
198. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 194, at 18-19; see infra notes 199, 202 and 
accompanying text. 
199. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 194, at 93, tbls. 2 & 3; see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, 42, 
44 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/Judicia1Businespdfversion.pdf; 
Carl Tobias, Fourth Circuit Publication Practices, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1733, 1739 (2005); 
infra note 203. 
200. Letter from Boyce F. Martin Jr., Sixth Circuit Chief Judge, to Sen. Charles Grassley, 
Chair, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Admin. Oversight & the Courts, (June 19, 1998) (on 
file with author); see also supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
201. Some judges did dissent. GRASSLEY REPORT, supra note 67, at 1, 4; Tobias, supra note 
54, at 749. 
202. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 194, at 18, 21. The conservative estimates on which 
the Conference bases suggestions indicate the Sixth Circuit requires one new judgeship. See S. 
525, llOth Cong. (2007); S. 2774, llOth Cong. (2008); S. 1653, lllth Cong. (2009); see also 
Tobias supra note 54, at 753. But see GRASSLEY REPORT, supra note 67, at 2-7. In 1999, the 
Conference had recommended two new seats. S. 1145, 106th Cong. (1999). 
203. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 194, at 93, tbl. 2, 95, tbl. 7, 108, tbl. 6a; see ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 199, at 42, 44. 
204. See supra notes 176-84 and accompanying text; see also supra note 71 and 
accompanying text. These are sharply disputed, unresolved questions. See supra notes 67-69 
and accompanying text. Authorizing new seats obviously will have limited impact, if the Senate 
cannot approve nominees. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appeals court vacancies threaten modem justice. The nascent Obama 
Administration and Democratic and Republican Senate members have an 
historic opportunity to improve the contemporary process by depoliticizing 
appointments. They should reconcile differences, resolve or temper the 
selection problem, and halt or at least decrease criticism of each other. Top-
ranking legal figures, including the new Attorney General, Eric Holder, and 
White House Counsel, Gregory Craig, as well as the Democratic and 
Republican Senate leaders, Harry Reid and Mitch McConnell, ought to 
discharge this profound responsibility. 
Earlier administrations and chamber members on both sides of the aisle 
have introduced, cultivated, and sustained unproductive dynamics. All 
recent presidents have nominated controversial attorneys multiple times, the 
Judiciary Committee has not always expedited candidate assessment, and 
both parties may have slowed floor debates and votes when they lacked 
control of the White House. The administration and Republican and 
Democratic senators, thus, ought to jettison or reexamine the use of 
numerous divisive practices. 
Chamber members from jurisdictions in every appellate tribunal should 
increase communications within their states, among elected colleagues, and 
with the President. If lawmakers from the states and Executive Branch 
officials analyze and institute a number of recommendations espoused, they 
might improve appointments in the legislators' jurisdictions, each circuit, 
and perhaps the nation. 
